mac80211: Update to backports-5.10.42

[openwrt/openwrt.git] / package / kernel / mac80211 / patches / subsys / 381-mac80211-prevent-mixed-key-and-fragment-cache-attack.patch

diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/381-mac80211-prevent-mixed-key-and-fragment-cache-attack.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/381-mac80211-prevent-mixed-key-and-fragment-cache-attack.patch
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index de0f89a..0000000
--- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/381-mac80211-prevent-mixed-key-and-fragment-cache-attack.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
-Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:43 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks
-
-Simultaneously prevent mixed key attacks (CVE-2020-24587) and fragment
-cache attacks (CVE-2020-24586). This is accomplished by assigning a
-unique color to every key (per interface) and using this to track which
-key was used to decrypt a fragment. When reassembling frames, it is
-now checked whether all fragments were decrypted using the same key.
-
-To assure that fragment cache attacks are also prevented, the ID that is
-assigned to keys is unique even over (re)associations and (re)connects.
-This means fragments separated by a (re)association or (re)connect will
-not be reassembled. Because mac80211 now also prevents the reassembly of
-mixed encrypted and plaintext fragments, all cache attacks are prevented.
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
-Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
----
-
---- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
-+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
-@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry {
-       u8 rx_queue;
-       bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
-       u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */
-+      unsigned int key_color;
- };
- 
- 
---- a/net/mac80211/key.c
-+++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
-@@ -799,6 +799,7 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_
-                      struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
-                      struct sta_info *sta)
- {
-+      static atomic_t key_color = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
-       struct ieee80211_key *old_key;
-       int idx = key->conf.keyidx;
-       bool pairwise = key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE;
-@@ -850,6 +851,12 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_
-       key->sdata = sdata;
-       key->sta = sta;
- 
-+      /*
-+       * Assign a unique ID to every key so we can easily prevent mixed
-+       * key and fragment cache attacks.
-+       */
-+      key->color = atomic_inc_return(&key_color);
-+
-       increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
- 
-       ret = ieee80211_key_replace(sdata, sta, pairwise, old_key, key);
---- a/net/mac80211/key.h
-+++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
-@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
-       } debugfs;
- #endif
- 
-+      unsigned int color;
-+
-       /*
-        * key config, must be last because it contains key
-        * material as variable length member
---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
-+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
-@@ -2265,6 +2265,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
-                        * next fragment has a sequential PN value.
-                        */
-                       entry->check_sequential_pn = true;
-+                      entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
-                       memcpy(entry->last_pn,
-                              rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue],
-                              IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
-@@ -2302,6 +2303,11 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
- 
-               if (!requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc))
-                       return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
-+
-+              /* Prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks */
-+              if (entry->key_color != rx->key->color)
-+                      return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
-+
-               memcpy(pn, entry->last_pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
-               for (i = IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-                       pn[i]++;