+++ /dev/null
-From 43f8f404e2e8cd81baa4d89706e40901c466c7bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Horia=20Geant=C4=83?= <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
-Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2020 11:48:39 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] LF-292-1 crypto: caam - refactor RNG initialization
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-RNG (re-)initialization will be needed on pm resume path,
-thus refactor the corresponding code out of the probe callback.
-
-Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
-Reviewed-by: Valentin Ciocoi Radulescu <valentin.ciocoi@nxp.com>
-Signed-off-by: Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand@nxp.com>
-Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <leonard.crestez@nxp.com>
-Signed-off-by: Dong Aisheng <aisheng.dong@nxp.com>
----
- drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c | 189 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
- 1 file changed, 102 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)
-
---- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
-+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
-@@ -327,13 +327,12 @@ static int instantiate_rng(struct device
- /*
- * kick_trng - sets the various parameters for enabling the initialization
- * of the RNG4 block in CAAM
-- * @pdev - pointer to the platform device
-+ * @dev - pointer to the controller device
- * @ent_delay - Defines the length (in system clocks) of each entropy sample.
- */
--static void kick_trng(struct platform_device *pdev, int ent_delay)
-+static void kick_trng(struct device *dev, int ent_delay)
- {
-- struct device *ctrldev = &pdev->dev;
-- struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(ctrldev);
-+ struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
- struct caam_ctrl __iomem *ctrl;
- struct rng4tst __iomem *r4tst;
- u32 val;
-@@ -571,10 +570,105 @@ static void caam_dma_dev_unregister(void
- platform_device_unregister(data);
- }
-
-+static int caam_ctrl_rng_init(struct device *dev)
-+{
-+ struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
-+ struct caam_ctrl __iomem *ctrl = ctrlpriv->ctrl;
-+ int ret, gen_sk, ent_delay = RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MIN;
-+ u8 rng_vid;
-+
-+ if (ctrlpriv->era < 10) {
-+ struct caam_perfmon __iomem *perfmon;
-+
-+ perfmon = ctrlpriv->total_jobrs ?
-+ (struct caam_perfmon *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->perfmon :
-+ (struct caam_perfmon *)&ctrl->perfmon;
-+
-+ rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_id_ls) &
-+ CHA_ID_LS_RNG_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_RNG_SHIFT;
-+ } else {
-+ struct version_regs __iomem *vreg;
-+
-+ vreg = ctrlpriv->total_jobrs ?
-+ (struct version_regs *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->vreg :
-+ (struct version_regs *)&ctrl->vreg;
-+
-+ rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&vreg->rng) & CHA_VER_VID_MASK) >>
-+ CHA_VER_VID_SHIFT;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If SEC has RNG version >= 4 and RNG state handle has not been
-+ * already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
-+ * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC f/w.
-+ */
-+ if (!ctrlpriv->mc_en && rng_vid >= 4) {
-+ ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
-+ rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
-+ /*
-+ * If the secure keys (TDKEK, JDKEK, TDSK), were already
-+ * generated, signal this to the function that is instantiating
-+ * the state handles. An error would occur if RNG4 attempts
-+ * to regenerate these keys before the next POR.
-+ */
-+ gen_sk = ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_SKVN ? 0 : 1;
-+ ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_IFMASK;
-+ do {
-+ int inst_handles =
-+ rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) &
-+ RDSTA_IFMASK;
-+ /*
-+ * If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
-+ * (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
-+ * parameters are properly set and thus the function
-+ * setting these (kick_trng(...)) is skipped.
-+ * Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
-+ * the TRNG parameters.
-+ */
-+ if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
-+ dev_info(dev,
-+ "Entropy delay = %u\n",
-+ ent_delay);
-+ kick_trng(dev, ent_delay);
-+ ent_delay += 400;
-+ }
-+ /*
-+ * if instantiate_rng(...) fails, the loop will rerun
-+ * and the kick_trng(...) function will modify the
-+ * upper and lower limits of the entropy sampling
-+ * interval, leading to a sucessful initialization of
-+ * the RNG.
-+ */
-+ ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
-+ gen_sk);
-+ if (ret == -EAGAIN)
-+ /*
-+ * if here, the loop will rerun,
-+ * so don't hog the CPU
-+ */
-+ cpu_relax();
-+ } while ((ret == -EAGAIN) && (ent_delay < RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MAX));
-+ if (ret) {
-+ dev_err(dev, "failed to instantiate RNG");
-+ return ret;
-+ }
-+ /*
-+ * Set handles init'ed by this module as the complement of the
-+ * already initialized ones
-+ */
-+ ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_IFMASK;
-+
-+ /* Enable RDB bit so that RNG works faster */
-+ clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->scfgr, 0, SCFGR_RDBENABLE);
-+ }
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
- /* Probe routine for CAAM top (controller) level */
- static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
- {
-- int ret, ring, gen_sk, ent_delay = RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MIN;
-+ int ret, ring;
- u64 caam_id;
- const struct soc_device_attribute *imx_soc_match;
- static struct platform_device_info caam_dma_pdev_info = {
-@@ -592,7 +686,6 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_de
- struct dentry *dfs_root;
- #endif
- u32 scfgr, comp_params;
-- u8 rng_vid;
- int pg_size;
- int BLOCK_OFFSET = 0;
- bool reg_access = true;
-@@ -875,90 +968,12 @@ set_dma_mask:
- return ret;
- }
-
-- if (!reg_access)
-- goto report_live;
--
-- if (ctrlpriv->era < 10) {
-- rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_id_ls) &
-- CHA_ID_LS_RNG_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_RNG_SHIFT;
-- } else {
-- struct version_regs __iomem *vreg;
--
-- vreg = ring ? (struct version_regs *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->vreg :
-- (struct version_regs *)&ctrl->vreg;
--
-- rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&vreg->rng) & CHA_VER_VID_MASK) >>
-- CHA_VER_VID_SHIFT;
-- }
--
-- /*
-- * If SEC has RNG version >= 4 and RNG state handle has not been
-- * already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
-- * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC f/w.
-- */
-- if (!ctrlpriv->mc_en && rng_vid >= 4) {
-- ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
-- rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
-- /*
-- * If the secure keys (TDKEK, JDKEK, TDSK), were already
-- * generated, signal this to the function that is instantiating
-- * the state handles. An error would occur if RNG4 attempts
-- * to regenerate these keys before the next POR.
-- */
-- gen_sk = ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_SKVN ? 0 : 1;
-- ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_IFMASK;
-- do {
-- int inst_handles =
-- rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) &
-- RDSTA_IFMASK;
-- /*
-- * If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
-- * (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
-- * parameters are properly set and thus the function
-- * setting these (kick_trng(...)) is skipped.
-- * Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
-- * the TRNG parameters.
-- */
-- if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
-- dev_info(dev,
-- "Entropy delay = %u\n",
-- ent_delay);
-- kick_trng(pdev, ent_delay);
-- ent_delay += 400;
-- }
-- /*
-- * if instantiate_rng(...) fails, the loop will rerun
-- * and the kick_trng(...) function will modfiy the
-- * upper and lower limits of the entropy sampling
-- * interval, leading to a sucessful initialization of
-- * the RNG.
-- */
-- ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
-- gen_sk);
-- if (ret == -EAGAIN)
-- /*
-- * if here, the loop will rerun,
-- * so don't hog the CPU
-- */
-- cpu_relax();
-- } while ((ret == -EAGAIN) && (ent_delay < RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MAX));
-- if (ret) {
-- dev_err(dev, "failed to instantiate RNG");
-+ if (reg_access) {
-+ ret = caam_ctrl_rng_init(dev);
-+ if (ret)
- return ret;
-- }
-- /*
-- * Set handles init'ed by this module as the complement of the
-- * already initialized ones
-- */
-- ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_IFMASK;
--
-- /* Enable RDB bit so that RNG works faster */
-- clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->scfgr, 0, SCFGR_RDBENABLE);
- }
-
-- /* NOTE: RTIC detection ought to go here, around Si time */
--
--report_live:
- caam_id = (u64)rd_reg32(&perfmon->caam_id_ms) << 32 |
- (u64)rd_reg32(&perfmon->caam_id_ls);
-
projects / openwrt / staging / chunkeey.git / blobdiff