# Note: keep in sync with setuptools & pip
PYTHON3_VERSION_MAJOR:=3
PYTHON3_VERSION_MINOR:=8
-PYTHON3_VERSION_MICRO:=4
+PYTHON3_VERSION_MICRO:=5
PYTHON3_VERSION:=$(PYTHON3_VERSION_MAJOR).$(PYTHON3_VERSION_MINOR)
PKG_SOURCE:=Python-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.xz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.python.org/ftp/python/$(PKG_VERSION)
-PKG_HASH:=5f41968a95afe9bc12192d7e6861aab31e80a46c46fa59d3d837def6a4cd4d37
+PKG_HASH:=e3003ed57db17e617acb382b0cade29a248c6026b1bd8aad1f976e9af66a83b0
PKG_MAINTAINER:=Alexandru Ardelean <ardeleanalex@gmail.com>, Jeffery To <jeffery.to@gmail.com>
PKG_LICENSE:=Python/2.0
define Package/python3-distutils
$(call Package/python3/Default)
TITLE:=Python $(PYTHON3_VERSION) distutils module
- DEPENDS:=+python3-light
+ DEPENDS:=+python3-light +python3-email
endef
$(eval $(call Py3BasePackage,python3-distutils, \
+++ /dev/null
-From f56c75ed53dcad4d59dff4377ae463d6b96acd3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
- <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2020 06:05:44 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] bpo-41288: Fix a crash in unpickling invalid NEWOBJ_EX.
- (GH-21458)
-
-Automerge-Triggered-By: @tiran
-(cherry picked from commit 4f309abf55f0e6f8950ac13d6ec83c22b8d47bf8)
-
-Co-authored-by: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com>
----
- Lib/test/pickletester.py | 18 ++++++++++++
- .../2020-07-13-15-06-35.bpo-41288.8mn5P-.rst | 2 ++
- Modules/_pickle.c | 29 ++++++++++++++-----
- 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-13-15-06-35.bpo-41288.8mn5P-.rst
-
-diff --git a/Lib/test/pickletester.py b/Lib/test/pickletester.py
-index 9401043d78d18..ff7bbb0c8a9bf 100644
---- a/Lib/test/pickletester.py
-+++ b/Lib/test/pickletester.py
-@@ -1170,6 +1170,24 @@ def test_compat_unpickle(self):
- self.assertIs(type(unpickled), collections.UserDict)
- self.assertEqual(unpickled, collections.UserDict({1: 2}))
-
-+ def test_bad_reduce(self):
-+ self.assertEqual(self.loads(b'cbuiltins\nint\n)R.'), 0)
-+ self.check_unpickling_error(TypeError, b'N)R.')
-+ self.check_unpickling_error(TypeError, b'cbuiltins\nint\nNR.')
-+
-+ def test_bad_newobj(self):
-+ error = (pickle.UnpicklingError, TypeError)
-+ self.assertEqual(self.loads(b'cbuiltins\nint\n)\x81.'), 0)
-+ self.check_unpickling_error(error, b'cbuiltins\nlen\n)\x81.')
-+ self.check_unpickling_error(error, b'cbuiltins\nint\nN\x81.')
-+
-+ def test_bad_newobj_ex(self):
-+ error = (pickle.UnpicklingError, TypeError)
-+ self.assertEqual(self.loads(b'cbuiltins\nint\n)}\x92.'), 0)
-+ self.check_unpickling_error(error, b'cbuiltins\nlen\n)}\x92.')
-+ self.check_unpickling_error(error, b'cbuiltins\nint\nN}\x92.')
-+ self.check_unpickling_error(error, b'cbuiltins\nint\n)N\x92.')
-+
- def test_bad_stack(self):
- badpickles = [
- b'.', # STOP
-diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-13-15-06-35.bpo-41288.8mn5P-.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-13-15-06-35.bpo-41288.8mn5P-.rst
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000000..3c3adbabf16ff
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-13-15-06-35.bpo-41288.8mn5P-.rst
-@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
-+Unpickling invalid NEWOBJ_EX opcode with the C implementation raises now
-+UnpicklingError instead of crashing.
-diff --git a/Modules/_pickle.c b/Modules/_pickle.c
-index 55affb2c7c479..42ce62fc7cdf4 100644
---- a/Modules/_pickle.c
-+++ b/Modules/_pickle.c
-@@ -5988,23 +5988,30 @@ load_newobj_ex(UnpicklerObject *self)
- }
-
- if (!PyType_Check(cls)) {
-- Py_DECREF(kwargs);
-- Py_DECREF(args);
- PyErr_Format(st->UnpicklingError,
- "NEWOBJ_EX class argument must be a type, not %.200s",
- Py_TYPE(cls)->tp_name);
-- Py_DECREF(cls);
-- return -1;
-+ goto error;
- }
-
- if (((PyTypeObject *)cls)->tp_new == NULL) {
-- Py_DECREF(kwargs);
-- Py_DECREF(args);
-- Py_DECREF(cls);
- PyErr_SetString(st->UnpicklingError,
- "NEWOBJ_EX class argument doesn't have __new__");
-- return -1;
-+ goto error;
-+ }
-+ if (!PyTuple_Check(args)) {
-+ PyErr_Format(st->UnpicklingError,
-+ "NEWOBJ_EX args argument must be a tuple, not %.200s",
-+ Py_TYPE(args)->tp_name);
-+ goto error;
-+ }
-+ if (!PyDict_Check(kwargs)) {
-+ PyErr_Format(st->UnpicklingError,
-+ "NEWOBJ_EX kwargs argument must be a dict, not %.200s",
-+ Py_TYPE(kwargs)->tp_name);
-+ goto error;
- }
-+
- obj = ((PyTypeObject *)cls)->tp_new((PyTypeObject *)cls, args, kwargs);
- Py_DECREF(kwargs);
- Py_DECREF(args);
-@@ -6014,6 +6021,12 @@ load_newobj_ex(UnpicklerObject *self)
- }
- PDATA_PUSH(self->stack, obj, -1);
- return 0;
-+
-+error:
-+ Py_DECREF(kwargs);
-+ Py_DECREF(args);
-+ Py_DECREF(cls);
-+ return -1;
- }
-
- static int
+++ /dev/null
-From c55479556db015f48fc8bbca17f64d3e65598559 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
- <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2020 05:30:53 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] [3.8] bpo-39017: Avoid infinite loop in the tarfile module
- (GH-21454) (GH-21483)
-
-Avoid infinite loop when reading specially crafted TAR files using the tarfile module
-(CVE-2019-20907).
-(cherry picked from commit 5a8d121a1f3ef5ad7c105ee378cc79a3eac0c7d4)
-
-
-Co-authored-by: Rishi <rishi_devan@mail.com>
-
-Automerge-Triggered-By: @encukou
----
- Lib/tarfile.py | 2 ++
- Lib/test/recursion.tar | Bin 0 -> 516 bytes
- Lib/test/test_tarfile.py | 7 +++++++
- .../2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst | 1 +
- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 Lib/test/recursion.tar
- create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst
-
-diff --git a/Lib/tarfile.py b/Lib/tarfile.py
-index d31b9cbb51d65..7a69e1b1aa544 100755
---- a/Lib/tarfile.py
-+++ b/Lib/tarfile.py
-@@ -1241,6 +1241,8 @@ def _proc_pax(self, tarfile):
-
- length, keyword = match.groups()
- length = int(length)
-+ if length == 0:
-+ raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header")
- value = buf[match.end(2) + 1:match.start(1) + length - 1]
-
- # Normally, we could just use "utf-8" as the encoding and "strict"
-diff --git a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
-index 15324a4e48819..b512168d6ea87 100644
---- a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
-+++ b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
-@@ -397,6 +397,13 @@ def test_premature_end_of_archive(self):
- with self.assertRaisesRegex(tarfile.ReadError, "unexpected end of data"):
- tar.extractfile(t).read()
-
-+ def test_length_zero_header(self):
-+ # bpo-39017 (CVE-2019-20907): reading a zero-length header should fail
-+ # with an exception
-+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(tarfile.ReadError, "file could not be opened successfully"):
-+ with tarfile.open(support.findfile('recursion.tar')) as tar:
-+ pass
-+
- class MiscReadTestBase(CommonReadTest):
- def requires_name_attribute(self):
- pass
-diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000000..ad26676f8b856
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst
-@@ -0,0 +1 @@
-+Avoid infinite loop when reading specially crafted TAR files using the tarfile module (CVE-2019-20907).
+++ /dev/null
-From 668d321476d974c4f51476b33aaca870272523bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
- <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2020 13:39:12 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] bpo-39603: Prevent header injection in http methods
- (GH-18485)
-
-reject control chars in http method in http.client.putrequest to prevent http header injection
-(cherry picked from commit 8ca8a2e8fb068863c1138f07e3098478ef8be12e)
-
-Co-authored-by: AMIR <31338382+amiremohamadi@users.noreply.github.com>
----
- Lib/http/client.py | 15 +++++++++++++
- Lib/test/test_httplib.py | 22 +++++++++++++++++++
- .../2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst | 2 ++
- 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
-
-diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py
-index 019380a720318..c2ad0471bfee5 100644
---- a/Lib/http/client.py
-+++ b/Lib/http/client.py
-@@ -147,6 +147,10 @@
- # _is_allowed_url_pchars_re = re.compile(r"^[/!$&'()*+,;=:@%a-zA-Z0-9._~-]+$")
- # We are more lenient for assumed real world compatibility purposes.
-
-+# These characters are not allowed within HTTP method names
-+# to prevent http header injection.
-+_contains_disallowed_method_pchar_re = re.compile('[\x00-\x1f]')
-+
- # We always set the Content-Length header for these methods because some
- # servers will otherwise respond with a 411
- _METHODS_EXPECTING_BODY = {'PATCH', 'POST', 'PUT'}
-@@ -1087,6 +1091,8 @@ def putrequest(self, method, url, skip_host=False,
- else:
- raise CannotSendRequest(self.__state)
-
-+ self._validate_method(method)
-+
- # Save the method for use later in the response phase
- self._method = method
-
-@@ -1177,6 +1183,15 @@ def _encode_request(self, request):
- # ASCII also helps prevent CVE-2019-9740.
- return request.encode('ascii')
-
-+ def _validate_method(self, method):
-+ """Validate a method name for putrequest."""
-+ # prevent http header injection
-+ match = _contains_disallowed_method_pchar_re.search(method)
-+ if match:
-+ raise ValueError(
-+ f"method can't contain control characters. {method!r} "
-+ f"(found at least {match.group()!r})")
-+
- def _validate_path(self, url):
- """Validate a url for putrequest."""
- # Prevent CVE-2019-9740.
-diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
-index 8f0e27a1fb836..5a5fcecbc9c15 100644
---- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
-+++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
-@@ -364,6 +364,28 @@ def test_headers_debuglevel(self):
- self.assertEqual(lines[3], "header: Second: val2")
-
-
-+class HttpMethodTests(TestCase):
-+ def test_invalid_method_names(self):
-+ methods = (
-+ 'GET\r',
-+ 'POST\n',
-+ 'PUT\n\r',
-+ 'POST\nValue',
-+ 'POST\nHOST:abc',
-+ 'GET\nrHost:abc\n',
-+ 'POST\rRemainder:\r',
-+ 'GET\rHOST:\n',
-+ '\nPUT'
-+ )
-+
-+ for method in methods:
-+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(
-+ ValueError, "method can't contain control characters"):
-+ conn = client.HTTPConnection('example.com')
-+ conn.sock = FakeSocket(None)
-+ conn.request(method=method, url="/")
-+
-+
- class TransferEncodingTest(TestCase):
- expected_body = b"It's just a flesh wound"
-
-diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000000..990affc3edd9d
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
-@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
-+Prevent http header injection by rejecting control characters in
-+http.client.putrequest(...).
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