hostapd: update to version 2016-01-15

[openwrt/svn-archive/archive.git] / package / network / services / hostapd / patches / 003-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch

diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/003-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/003-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index 36b4ca2..0000000
--- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/003-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
-
-strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
-resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
-result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
-argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
-
-This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
-has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
-would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
-upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
-(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
-
-Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
-rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
-larger than the maximum configured body length.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c
-index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644
---- a/src/wps/httpread.c
-+++ b/src/wps/httpread.c
-@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
-                                       if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
-                                               goto bad;
-                                       h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
-+                                      if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
-+                                          h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
-+                                              wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+                                                         "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
-+                                                         h->chunk_size);
-+                                              goto bad;
-+                                      }
-                                       /* throw away chunk header
-                                        * so we have only real data
-                                        */
--- 
-1.9.1
-