hostapd: update to version 2016-01-15

[openwrt/svn-archive/archive.git] / package / network / services / hostapd / patches / 004-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch

diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/004-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/004-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index 91627fb..0000000
--- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/004-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit
- and Confirm
-
-The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
-checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
-overflow when processing an invalid message.
-
-Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
-processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
-make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
-message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index f2b0926..a629437 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
-       BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
-       u16 offset;
-       u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
-+      size_t prime_len, order_len;
-+
-+      if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
-+              ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+              goto fin;
-+      }
-+
-+      prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
-+      order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
-+
-+      if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
-+              wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+                         "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+                         (unsigned int) payload_len,
-+                         (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
-+              goto fin;
-+      }
- 
-       if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-           ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
-@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
-       u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
-       int offset;
- 
-+      if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
-+              ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+              goto fin;
-+      }
-+
-+      if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
-+              wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+                         "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+                         (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
-+              goto fin;
-+      }
-+
-       /*
-        * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
-        *      prf
--- 
-1.9.1
-