hostapd: update to version 2016-01-15

[openwrt/svn-archive/archive.git] / package / network / services / hostapd / patches / 005-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch

diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index 5dca20b..0000000
--- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit
- and Confirm
-
-The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
-checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
-overflow when processing an invalid message.
-
-Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
-processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
-make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
-message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644
---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
-       BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
-       EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
-       int res = 0;
-+      size_t prime_len, order_len;
- 
-       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
- 
-+      prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
-+      order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
-+
-+      if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
-+              wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+                         "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+                         (unsigned int) payload_len,
-+                         (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
-+              goto fin;
-+      }
-+
-       if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-           ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-           ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
-       u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
-       int offset;
- 
-+      if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
-+              wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+                         "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+                         (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
-+              goto fin;
-+      }
-+
-       /* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
-       grp = htons(data->group_num);
-       ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
--- 
-1.9.1
-