From: Hauke Mehrtens Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 20:40:26 +0000 (+0200) Subject: curl: Fix multiple security problems X-Git-Url: http://git.openwrt.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=dc1b578a4cc1d7ec154a58baf3a813846c5adf9d;p=openwrt%2Fstaging%2Fdedeckeh.git curl: Fix multiple security problems This fixes the following security problems: * CVE-2018-14618: NTLM password overflow via integer overflow * CVE-2018-16839: SASL password overflow via integer overflow * CVE-2018-16840: use-after-free in handle close * CVE-2018-16842: warning message out-of-buffer read * CVE-2019-3823: SMTP end-of-response out-of-bounds read * CVE-2019-3822: NTLMv2 type-3 header stack buffer overflow * CVE-2018-16890: NTLM type-2 out-of-bounds buffer read Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens --- diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/Makefile b/package/network/utils/curl/Makefile index b4e3fd9d99..c7e7829edc 100644 --- a/package/network/utils/curl/Makefile +++ b/package/network/utils/curl/Makefile @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk PKG_NAME:=curl PKG_VERSION:=7.60.0 -PKG_RELEASE:=3 +PKG_RELEASE:=4 PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.xz PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://dl.uxnr.de/mirror/curl/ \ diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/401-CVE-2018-14618.patch b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/401-CVE-2018-14618.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..62d513c22e --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/401-CVE-2018-14618.patch @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +From 57d299a499155d4b327e341c6024e293b0418243 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2018 10:35:52 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Curl_ntlm_core_mk_nt_hash: return error on too long password + +... since it would cause an integer overflow if longer than (max size_t +/ 2). + +This is CVE-2018-14618 + +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-14618.html +Closes #2756 +Reported-by: Zhaoyang Wu +--- + lib/curl_ntlm_core.c | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c ++++ b/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c +@@ -557,8 +557,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_ntlm_core_mk_nt_hash(struc + unsigned char *ntbuffer /* 21 bytes */) + { + size_t len = strlen(password); +- unsigned char *pw = len ? malloc(len * 2) : strdup(""); ++ unsigned char *pw; + CURLcode result; ++ if(len > SIZE_T_MAX/2) /* avoid integer overflow */ ++ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; ++ pw = len ? malloc(len * 2) : strdup(""); + if(!pw) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/402-CVE-2018-16839.patch b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/402-CVE-2018-16839.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..188c77f1c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/402-CVE-2018-16839.patch @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +From f3a24d7916b9173c69a3e0ee790102993833d6c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2018 16:08:16 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Curl_auth_create_plain_message: fix too-large-input-check + +CVE-2018-16839 +Reported-by: Harry Sintonen +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16839.html +--- + lib/vauth/cleartext.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/lib/vauth/cleartext.c ++++ b/lib/vauth/cleartext.c +@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_plain_message( + plen = strlen(passwdp); + + /* Compute binary message length. Check for overflows. */ +- if((ulen > SIZE_T_MAX/2) || (plen > (SIZE_T_MAX/2 - 2))) ++ if((ulen > SIZE_T_MAX/4) || (plen > (SIZE_T_MAX/2 - 2))) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + plainlen = 2 * ulen + plen + 2; + diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/403-CVE-2018-16840.patch b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/403-CVE-2018-16840.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..00a36f6f19 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/403-CVE-2018-16840.patch @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +From 81d135d67155c5295b1033679c606165d4e28f3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2018 15:07:15 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid + use-after-free + +Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0) +CVE-2018-16840 +Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs) + +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html +--- + lib/url.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/lib/url.c ++++ b/lib/url.c +@@ -320,10 +320,12 @@ CURLcode Curl_close(struct Curl_easy *da + and detach this handle from there. */ + curl_multi_remove_handle(data->multi, data); + +- if(data->multi_easy) ++ if(data->multi_easy) { + /* when curl_easy_perform() is used, it creates its own multi handle to + use and this is the one */ + curl_multi_cleanup(data->multi_easy); ++ data->multi_easy = NULL; ++ } + + /* Destroy the timeout list that is held in the easy handle. It is + /normally/ done by curl_multi_remove_handle() but this is "just in diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/404-CVE-2018-16842.patch b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/404-CVE-2018-16842.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..50e325dc31 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/404-CVE-2018-16842.patch @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +From d530e92f59ae9bb2d47066c3c460b25d2ffeb211 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Sun, 28 Oct 2018 01:33:23 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] voutf: fix bad arethmetic when outputting warnings to stderr + +CVE-2018-16842 +Reported-by: Brian Carpenter +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16842.html +--- + src/tool_msgs.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/src/tool_msgs.c ++++ b/src/tool_msgs.c +@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static void voutf(struct GlobalConfig *c + (void)fwrite(ptr, cut + 1, 1, config->errors); + fputs("\n", config->errors); + ptr += cut + 1; /* skip the space too */ +- len -= cut; ++ len -= cut + 1; + } + else { + fputs(ptr, config->errors); diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/405-CVE-2019-3823.patch b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/405-CVE-2019-3823.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..58b0e1b599 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/405-CVE-2019-3823.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From 39df4073e5413fcdbb5a38da0c1ce6f1c0ceb484 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Gustafsson +Date: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 00:42:47 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] smtp: avoid risk of buffer overflow in strtol + +If the incoming len 5, but the buffer does not have a termination +after 5 bytes, the strtol() call may keep reading through the line +buffer until is exceeds its boundary. Fix by ensuring that we are +using a bounded read with a temporary buffer on the stack. + +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-3823.html +Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs) +CVE-2019-3823 +--- + lib/smtp.c | 8 ++++++-- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/lib/smtp.c ++++ b/lib/smtp.c +@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * +- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2018, Daniel Stenberg, , et al. ++ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2019, Daniel Stenberg, , et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms +@@ -207,8 +207,12 @@ static bool smtp_endofresp(struct connec + Section 4. Examples of RFC-4954 but some e-mail servers ignore this and + only send the response code instead as per Section 4.2. */ + if(line[3] == ' ' || len == 5) { ++ char tmpline[6]; ++ + result = TRUE; +- *resp = curlx_sltosi(strtol(line, NULL, 10)); ++ memset(tmpline, '\0', sizeof(tmpline)); ++ memcpy(tmpline, line, (len == 5 ? 5 : 3)); ++ *resp = curlx_sltosi(strtol(tmpline, NULL, 10)); + + /* Make sure real server never sends internal value */ + if(*resp == 1) diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/406-CVE-2019-3822.patch b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/406-CVE-2019-3822.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bb8bb6cb3f --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/406-CVE-2019-3822.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From 50c9484278c63b958655a717844f0721263939cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 12:59:28 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] ntlm: fix *_type3_message size check to avoid buffer overflow + +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-3822.html +Reported-by: Wenxiang Qian +CVE-2019-3822 +--- + lib/vauth/ntlm.c | 11 +++++++---- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +--- a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c ++++ b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c +@@ -776,11 +776,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_ntlm_type3_mes + }); + + #ifdef USE_NTRESPONSES +- if(size < (NTLM_BUFSIZE - ntresplen)) { +- DEBUGASSERT(size == (size_t)ntrespoff); +- memcpy(&ntlmbuf[size], ptr_ntresp, ntresplen); +- size += ntresplen; ++ /* ntresplen + size should not be risking an integer overflow here */ ++ if(ntresplen + size > sizeof(ntlmbuf)) { ++ failf(data, "incoming NTLM message too big"); ++ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } ++ DEBUGASSERT(size == (size_t)ntrespoff); ++ memcpy(&ntlmbuf[size], ptr_ntresp, ntresplen); ++ size += ntresplen; + + DEBUG_OUT({ + fprintf(stderr, "\n ntresp="); diff --git a/package/network/utils/curl/patches/407-CVE-2018-16890.patch b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/407-CVE-2018-16890.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9a51243ee3 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/utils/curl/patches/407-CVE-2018-16890.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From b780b30d1377adb10bbe774835f49e9b237fb9bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg +Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2019 20:33:08 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] NTLM: fix size check condition for type2 received data + +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16890.html +Reported-by: Wenxiang Qian +CVE-2018-16890 +--- + lib/vauth/ntlm.c | 7 ++++--- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c ++++ b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c +@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * +- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2017, Daniel Stenberg, , et al. ++ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2019, Daniel Stenberg, , et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms +@@ -182,10 +182,11 @@ static CURLcode ntlm_decode_type2_target + target_info_len = Curl_read16_le(&buffer[40]); + target_info_offset = Curl_read32_le(&buffer[44]); + if(target_info_len > 0) { +- if(((target_info_offset + target_info_len) > size) || ++ if((target_info_offset >= size) || ++ ((target_info_offset + target_info_len) > size) || + (target_info_offset < 48)) { + infof(data, "NTLM handshake failure (bad type-2 message). " +- "Target Info Offset Len is set incorrect by the peer\n"); ++ "Target Info Offset Len is set incorrect by the peer\n"); + return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING; + } +