PKG_NAME:=mac80211
-PKG_VERSION:=5.10.34-1
+PKG_VERSION:=5.10.42-1
PKG_RELEASE:=1
-PKG_SOURCE_URL:=@KERNEL/linux/kernel/projects/backports/stable/v5.10.34/
-PKG_HASH:=03c4ca6bf47d4e50b91b61bc2943a98c788439e56ce2b4080bc4c94141c2c15b
+PKG_SOURCE_URL:=@KERNEL/linux/kernel/projects/backports/stable/v5.10.42/
+PKG_HASH:=6876520105240844fdb32d1dcdf2bfdea291a37a96f16c892fda3776ba714fcb
PKG_SOURCE:=backports-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.xz
PKG_BUILD_DIR:=$(KERNEL_BUILD_DIR)/backports-$(PKG_VERSION)
void ath10k_thermal_event_temperature(struct ath10k *ar, int temperature);
--- a/local-symbols
+++ b/local-symbols
-@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ ATH10K_SNOC=
+@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ ATH10K_SNOC=
ATH10K_DEBUG=
ATH10K_DEBUGFS=
ATH10K_SPECTRAL=
+++ /dev/null
-From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
-Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:52 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: add CCMP PN replay protection for fragmented
- frames for PCIe
-
-PN replay check for not fragmented frames is finished in the firmware,
-but this was not done for fragmented frames when ath10k is used with
-QCA6174/QCA6377 PCIe. mac80211 has the function
-ieee80211_rx_h_defragment() for PN replay check for fragmented frames,
-but this does not get checked with QCA6174 due to the
-ieee80211_has_protected() condition not matching the cleared Protected
-bit case.
-
-Validate the PN of received fragmented frames within ath10k when CCMP is
-used and drop the fragment if the PN is not correct (incremented by
-exactly one from the previous fragment). This applies only for
-QCA6174/QCA6377 PCIe.
-
-Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
-Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
----
-
---- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h
-+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h
-@@ -846,6 +846,7 @@ enum htt_security_types {
-
- #define ATH10K_HTT_TXRX_PEER_SECURITY_MAX 2
- #define ATH10K_TXRX_NUM_EXT_TIDS 19
-+#define ATH10K_TXRX_NON_QOS_TID 16
-
- enum htt_security_flags {
- #define HTT_SECURITY_TYPE_MASK 0x7F
---- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
-+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
-@@ -1746,16 +1746,87 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload
- msdu->ip_summed = ath10k_htt_rx_get_csum_state(msdu);
- }
-
-+static u64 ath10k_htt_rx_h_get_pn(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff *skb,
-+ u16 offset,
-+ enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype)
-+{
-+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
-+ u64 pn = 0;
-+ u8 *ehdr;
-+
-+ hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + offset);
-+ ehdr = skb->data + offset + ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
-+
-+ if (enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2) {
-+ pn = ehdr[0];
-+ pn |= (u64)ehdr[1] << 8;
-+ pn |= (u64)ehdr[4] << 16;
-+ pn |= (u64)ehdr[5] << 24;
-+ pn |= (u64)ehdr[6] << 32;
-+ pn |= (u64)ehdr[7] << 40;
-+ }
-+ return pn;
-+}
-+
-+static bool ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_pn_check(struct ath10k *ar,
-+ struct sk_buff *skb,
-+ u16 peer_id,
-+ u16 offset,
-+ enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype)
-+{
-+ struct ath10k_peer *peer;
-+ union htt_rx_pn_t *last_pn, new_pn = {0};
-+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
-+ bool more_frags;
-+ u8 tid, frag_number;
-+ u32 seq;
-+
-+ peer = ath10k_peer_find_by_id(ar, peer_id);
-+ if (!peer) {
-+ ath10k_dbg(ar, ATH10K_DBG_HTT, "invalid peer for frag pn check\n");
-+ return false;
-+ }
-+
-+ hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + offset);
-+ if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
-+ tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr);
-+ else
-+ tid = ATH10K_TXRX_NON_QOS_TID;
-+
-+ last_pn = &peer->frag_tids_last_pn[tid];
-+ new_pn.pn48 = ath10k_htt_rx_h_get_pn(ar, skb, offset, enctype);
-+ more_frags = ieee80211_has_morefrags(hdr->frame_control);
-+ frag_number = le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl) & IEEE80211_SCTL_FRAG;
-+ seq = (__le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl) & IEEE80211_SCTL_SEQ) >> 4;
-+
-+ if (frag_number == 0) {
-+ last_pn->pn48 = new_pn.pn48;
-+ peer->frag_tids_seq[tid] = seq;
-+ } else {
-+ if (seq != peer->frag_tids_seq[tid])
-+ return false;
-+
-+ if (new_pn.pn48 != last_pn->pn48 + 1)
-+ return false;
-+
-+ last_pn->pn48 = new_pn.pn48;
-+ }
-+
-+ return true;
-+}
-+
- static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct ath10k *ar,
- struct sk_buff_head *amsdu,
- struct ieee80211_rx_status *status,
- bool fill_crypt_header,
- u8 *rx_hdr,
-- enum ath10k_pkt_rx_err *err)
-+ enum ath10k_pkt_rx_err *err,
-+ u16 peer_id,
-+ bool frag)
- {
- struct sk_buff *first;
- struct sk_buff *last;
-- struct sk_buff *msdu;
-+ struct sk_buff *msdu, *temp;
- struct htt_rx_desc *rxd;
- struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
- enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype;
-@@ -1768,6 +1839,7 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct
- bool is_decrypted;
- bool is_mgmt;
- u32 attention;
-+ bool frag_pn_check = true;
-
- if (skb_queue_empty(amsdu))
- return;
-@@ -1866,6 +1938,24 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct
- }
-
- skb_queue_walk(amsdu, msdu) {
-+ if (frag && !fill_crypt_header && is_decrypted &&
-+ enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2)
-+ frag_pn_check = ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_pn_check(ar,
-+ msdu,
-+ peer_id,
-+ 0,
-+ enctype);
-+
-+ if (!frag_pn_check) {
-+ /* Discard the fragment with invalid PN */
-+ temp = msdu->prev;
-+ __skb_unlink(msdu, amsdu);
-+ dev_kfree_skb_any(msdu);
-+ msdu = temp;
-+ frag_pn_check = true;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+
- ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload(msdu);
- ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap(ar, msdu, status, first_hdr, enctype,
- is_decrypted);
-@@ -2071,7 +2161,8 @@ static int ath10k_htt_rx_handle_amsdu(st
- ath10k_htt_rx_h_unchain(ar, &amsdu, &drop_cnt, &unchain_cnt);
-
- ath10k_htt_rx_h_filter(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, &drop_cnt_filter);
-- ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, true, first_hdr, &err);
-+ ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, true, first_hdr, &err, 0,
-+ false);
- msdus_to_queue = skb_queue_len(&amsdu);
- ath10k_htt_rx_h_enqueue(ar, &amsdu, rx_status);
-
-@@ -3027,7 +3118,7 @@ static int ath10k_htt_rx_in_ord_ind(stru
- ath10k_htt_rx_h_ppdu(ar, &amsdu, status, vdev_id);
- ath10k_htt_rx_h_filter(ar, &amsdu, status, NULL);
- ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, status, false, NULL,
-- NULL);
-+ NULL, peer_id, frag);
- ath10k_htt_rx_h_enqueue(ar, &amsdu, status);
- break;
- case -EAGAIN:
+++ /dev/null
-From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
-Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:53 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: drop fragments with multicast DA for PCIe
-
-Fragmentation is not used with multicast frames. Discard unexpected
-fragments with multicast DA. This fixes CVE-2020-26145.
-
-Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
-Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
----
-
---- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
-+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
-@@ -1768,6 +1768,16 @@ static u64 ath10k_htt_rx_h_get_pn(struct
- return pn;
- }
-
-+static bool ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_multicast_check(struct ath10k *ar,
-+ struct sk_buff *skb,
-+ u16 offset)
-+{
-+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
-+
-+ hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + offset);
-+ return !is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1);
-+}
-+
- static bool ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_pn_check(struct ath10k *ar,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- u16 peer_id,
-@@ -1839,7 +1849,7 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct
- bool is_decrypted;
- bool is_mgmt;
- u32 attention;
-- bool frag_pn_check = true;
-+ bool frag_pn_check = true, multicast_check = true;
-
- if (skb_queue_empty(amsdu))
- return;
-@@ -1946,13 +1956,20 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct
- 0,
- enctype);
-
-- if (!frag_pn_check) {
-- /* Discard the fragment with invalid PN */
-+ if (frag)
-+ multicast_check = ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_multicast_check(ar,
-+ msdu,
-+ 0);
-+
-+ if (!frag_pn_check || !multicast_check) {
-+ /* Discard the fragment with invalid PN or multicast DA
-+ */
- temp = msdu->prev;
- __skb_unlink(msdu, amsdu);
- dev_kfree_skb_any(msdu);
- msdu = temp;
- frag_pn_check = true;
-+ multicast_check = true;
- continue;
- }
-
+++ /dev/null
-From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
-Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:54 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: drop fragments with multicast DA for SDIO
-
-Fragmentation is not used with multicast frames. Discard unexpected
-fragments with multicast DA. This fixes CVE-2020-26145.
-
-Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 SDIO WLAN.RMH.4.4.1-00049
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
-Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
----
-
---- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
-+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
-@@ -2617,6 +2617,13 @@ static bool ath10k_htt_rx_proc_rx_frag_i
- rx_desc = (struct htt_hl_rx_desc *)(skb->data + tot_hdr_len);
- rx_desc_info = __le32_to_cpu(rx_desc->info);
-
-+ hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)((u8 *)rx_desc + rx_hl->fw_desc.len);
-+
-+ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) {
-+ /* Discard the fragment with multicast DA */
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
- if (!MS(rx_desc_info, HTT_RX_DESC_HL_INFO_ENCRYPTED)) {
- spin_unlock_bh(&ar->data_lock);
- return ath10k_htt_rx_proc_rx_ind_hl(htt, &resp->rx_ind_hl, skb,
-@@ -2624,8 +2631,6 @@ static bool ath10k_htt_rx_proc_rx_frag_i
- HTT_RX_NON_TKIP_MIC);
- }
-
-- hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)((u8 *)rx_desc + rx_hl->fw_desc.len);
--
- if (ieee80211_has_retry(hdr->frame_control))
- goto err;
-
+++ /dev/null
-From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
-Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:55 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: drop MPDU which has discard flag set by firmware
- for SDIO
-
-When the discard flag is set by the firmware for an MPDU, it should be
-dropped. This allows a mitigation for CVE-2020-24588 to be implemented
-in the firmware.
-
-Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 SDIO WLAN.RMH.4.4.1-00049
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
-Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
----
-
---- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
-+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
-@@ -2312,6 +2312,11 @@ static bool ath10k_htt_rx_proc_rx_ind_hl
- fw_desc = &rx->fw_desc;
- rx_desc_len = fw_desc->len;
-
-+ if (fw_desc->u.bits.discard) {
-+ ath10k_dbg(ar, ATH10K_DBG_HTT, "htt discard mpdu\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
- /* I have not yet seen any case where num_mpdu_ranges > 1.
- * qcacld does not seem handle that case either, so we introduce the
- * same limitiation here as well.
---- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/rx_desc.h
-+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/rx_desc.h
-@@ -1282,7 +1282,19 @@ struct fw_rx_desc_base {
- #define FW_RX_DESC_UDP (1 << 6)
-
- struct fw_rx_desc_hl {
-- u8 info0;
-+ union {
-+ struct {
-+ u8 discard:1,
-+ forward:1,
-+ any_err:1,
-+ dup_err:1,
-+ reserved:1,
-+ inspect:1,
-+ extension:2;
-+ } bits;
-+ u8 info0;
-+ } u;
-+
- u8 version;
- u8 len;
- u8 flags;
+++ /dev/null
-From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
-Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:56 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: Fix TKIP Michael MIC verification for PCIe
-
-TKIP Michael MIC was not verified properly for PCIe cases since the
-validation steps in ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify() in mac80211 did
-not get fully executed due to unexpected flag values in
-ieee80211_rx_status.
-
-Fix this by setting the flags property to meet mac80211 expectations for
-performing Michael MIC validation there. This fixes CVE-2020-26141. It
-does the same as ath10k_htt_rx_proc_rx_ind_hl() for SDIO which passed
-MIC verification case. This applies only to QCA6174/QCA9377 PCIe.
-
-Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
-Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
----
-
---- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
-+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
-@@ -1974,6 +1974,11 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct
- }
-
- ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload(msdu);
-+
-+ if (frag && !fill_crypt_header &&
-+ enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_TKIP_WPA)
-+ status->flag &= ~RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED;
-+
- ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap(ar, msdu, status, first_hdr, enctype,
- is_decrypted);
-
-@@ -1991,6 +1996,11 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct
-
- hdr = (void *)msdu->data;
- hdr->frame_control &= ~__cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
-+
-+ if (frag && !fill_crypt_header &&
-+ enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_TKIP_WPA)
-+ status->flag &= ~RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED &
-+ ~RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED;
- }
- }
-
+++ /dev/null
-From: Sriram R <srirrama@codeaurora.org>
-Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:57 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: Validate first subframe of A-MSDU before
- processing the list
-
-In certain scenarios a normal MSDU can be received as an A-MSDU when
-the A-MSDU present bit of a QoS header gets flipped during reception.
-Since this bit is unauthenticated, the hardware crypto engine can pass
-the frame to the driver without any error indication.
-
-This could result in processing unintended subframes collected in the
-A-MSDU list. Hence, validate A-MSDU list by checking if the first frame
-has a valid subframe header.
-
-Comparing the non-aggregated MSDU and an A-MSDU, the fields of the first
-subframe DA matches the LLC/SNAP header fields of a normal MSDU.
-In order to avoid processing such frames, add a validation to
-filter such A-MSDU frames where the first subframe header DA matches
-with the LLC/SNAP header pattern.
-
-Tested-on: QCA9984 hw1.0 PCI 10.4-3.10-00047
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Sriram R <srirrama@codeaurora.org>
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
-Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
----
-
---- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
-+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c
-@@ -2108,14 +2108,62 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_unchain(stru
- ath10k_unchain_msdu(amsdu, unchain_cnt);
- }
-
-+static bool ath10k_htt_rx_validate_amsdu(struct ath10k *ar,
-+ struct sk_buff_head *amsdu)
-+{
-+ u8 *subframe_hdr;
-+ struct sk_buff *first;
-+ bool is_first, is_last;
-+ struct htt_rx_desc *rxd;
-+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
-+ size_t hdr_len, crypto_len;
-+ enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype;
-+ int bytes_aligned = ar->hw_params.decap_align_bytes;
-+
-+ first = skb_peek(amsdu);
-+
-+ rxd = (void *)first->data - sizeof(*rxd);
-+ hdr = (void *)rxd->rx_hdr_status;
-+
-+ is_first = !!(rxd->msdu_end.common.info0 &
-+ __cpu_to_le32(RX_MSDU_END_INFO0_FIRST_MSDU));
-+ is_last = !!(rxd->msdu_end.common.info0 &
-+ __cpu_to_le32(RX_MSDU_END_INFO0_LAST_MSDU));
-+
-+ /* Return in case of non-aggregated msdu */
-+ if (is_first && is_last)
-+ return true;
-+
-+ /* First msdu flag is not set for the first msdu of the list */
-+ if (!is_first)
-+ return false;
-+
-+ enctype = MS(__le32_to_cpu(rxd->mpdu_start.info0),
-+ RX_MPDU_START_INFO0_ENCRYPT_TYPE);
-+
-+ hdr_len = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
-+ crypto_len = ath10k_htt_rx_crypto_param_len(ar, enctype);
-+
-+ subframe_hdr = (u8 *)hdr + round_up(hdr_len, bytes_aligned) +
-+ crypto_len;
-+
-+ /* Validate if the amsdu has a proper first subframe.
-+ * There are chances a single msdu can be received as amsdu when
-+ * the unauthenticated amsdu flag of a QoS header
-+ * gets flipped in non-SPP AMSDU's, in such cases the first
-+ * subframe has llc/snap header in place of a valid da.
-+ * return false if the da matches rfc1042 pattern
-+ */
-+ if (ether_addr_equal(subframe_hdr, rfc1042_header))
-+ return false;
-+
-+ return true;
-+}
-+
- static bool ath10k_htt_rx_amsdu_allowed(struct ath10k *ar,
- struct sk_buff_head *amsdu,
- struct ieee80211_rx_status *rx_status)
- {
-- /* FIXME: It might be a good idea to do some fuzzy-testing to drop
-- * invalid/dangerous frames.
-- */
--
- if (!rx_status->freq) {
- ath10k_dbg(ar, ATH10K_DBG_HTT, "no channel configured; ignoring frame(s)!\n");
- return false;
-@@ -2126,6 +2174,11 @@ static bool ath10k_htt_rx_amsdu_allowed(
- return false;
- }
-
-+ if (!ath10k_htt_rx_validate_amsdu(ar, amsdu)) {
-+ ath10k_dbg(ar, ATH10K_DBG_HTT, "invalid amsdu received\n");
-+ return false;
-+ }
-+
- return true;
- }
-
help
--- a/local-symbols
+++ b/local-symbols
-@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ ADM8211=
+@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ ADM8211=
ATH_COMMON=
WLAN_VENDOR_ATH=
ATH_DEBUG=
--- a/local-symbols
+++ b/local-symbols
-@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ ATH9K_WOW=
+@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ ATH9K_WOW=
ATH9K_RFKILL=
ATH9K_CHANNEL_CONTEXT=
ATH9K_PCOEM=
ath10k_core-$(CONFIG_DEV_COREDUMP) += coredump.o
--- a/local-symbols
+++ b/local-symbols
-@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ ATH10K_DEBUG=
+@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ ATH10K_DEBUG=
ATH10K_DEBUGFS=
ATH10K_SPECTRAL=
ATH10K_THERMAL=
{
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/wmi-tlv.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/wmi-tlv.c
-@@ -4591,6 +4591,8 @@ static const struct wmi_ops wmi_tlv_ops
+@@ -4594,6 +4594,8 @@ static const struct wmi_ops wmi_tlv_ops
.gen_echo = ath10k_wmi_tlv_op_gen_echo,
.gen_vdev_spectral_conf = ath10k_wmi_tlv_op_gen_vdev_spectral_conf,
.gen_vdev_spectral_enable = ath10k_wmi_tlv_op_gen_vdev_spectral_enable,
Signed-off-by: Rafał Miłecki <zajec5@gmail.com>
---
---- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/core.c
-+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/core.c
-@@ -1557,6 +1557,7 @@ int __init brcmf_core_init(void)
- {
- if (!schedule_work(&brcmf_driver_work))
- return -EBUSY;
-+ flush_work(&brcmf_driver_work);
-
- return 0;
- }
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c
@@ -431,6 +431,7 @@ struct brcmf_fw {
- echo "" ;\
- done \
- ) > Kconfig.kernel ;\
-- kver=$$($(MAKE) --no-print-directory -C $(KLIB_BUILD) kernelversion | \
-- sed 's/^\(\([3-5]\|2\.6\)\.[0-9]\+\).*/\1/;t;d') ;\
+- kver=$$($(MAKE) --no-print-directory -C $(KLIB_BUILD) M=$(BACKPORT_DIR) \
+- kernelversion | sed 's/^\(\([3-5]\|2\.6\)\.[0-9]\+\).*/\1/;t;d');\
- test "$$kver" != "" || echo "Kernel version parse failed!" ;\
- test "$$kver" != "" ;\
- kvers="$$(seq 14 39 | sed 's/^/2.6./')" ;\
+ @echo " done."
+
+Kconfig.versions: Kconfig.kernel
-+ @kver=$$($(MAKE) --no-print-directory -C $(KLIB_BUILD) kernelversion | \
-+ sed 's/^\(\([3-5]\|2\.6\)\.[0-9]\+\).*/\1/;t;d') ;\
++ @kver=$$($(MAKE) --no-print-directory -C $(KLIB_BUILD) M=$(BACKPORT_DIR) \
++ kernelversion | sed 's/^\(\([3-5]\|2\.6\)\.[0-9]\+\).*/\1/;t;d');\
+ test "$$kver" != "" || echo "Kernel version parse failed!" ;\
+ test "$$kver" != "" ;\
+ kvers="$$(seq 14 39 | sed 's/^/2.6./')" ;\
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwl8k.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwl8k.c
-@@ -5694,6 +5694,7 @@ MODULE_FIRMWARE("mwl8k/fmimage_8366.fw")
+@@ -5695,6 +5695,7 @@ MODULE_FIRMWARE("mwl8k/fmimage_8366.fw")
MODULE_FIRMWARE(MWL8K_8366_AP_FW(MWL8K_8366_AP_FW_API));
static const struct pci_device_id mwl8k_pci_id_table[] = {
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwl8k.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwl8k.c
-@@ -6279,6 +6279,8 @@ static int mwl8k_probe(struct pci_dev *p
+@@ -6280,6 +6280,8 @@ static int mwl8k_probe(struct pci_dev *p
priv->running_bsses = 0;
return rc;
err_stop_firmware:
-@@ -6312,8 +6314,6 @@ static void mwl8k_remove(struct pci_dev
+@@ -6313,8 +6315,6 @@ static void mwl8k_remove(struct pci_dev
return;
priv = hw->priv;
--- a/local-symbols
+++ b/local-symbols
-@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ RT2X00_LIB_FIRMWARE=
+@@ -332,6 +332,7 @@ RT2X00_LIB_FIRMWARE=
RT2X00_LIB_CRYPTO=
RT2X00_LIB_LEDS=
RT2X00_LIB_DEBUGFS=
#endif /* AES_GCM_H */
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
-@@ -311,7 +311,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct iee
+@@ -312,7 +312,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct iee
}
{
__le16 mask_fc;
int a4_included, mgmt;
-@@ -341,14 +342,8 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s
+@@ -342,14 +343,8 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s
else
qos_tid = 0;
/* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
* Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
-@@ -356,6 +351,8 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s
+@@ -357,6 +352,8 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s
b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
/* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
* FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
-@@ -412,7 +409,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
+@@ -413,7 +410,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
u8 *pos;
u8 pn[6];
u64 pn64;
u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
if (info->control.hw_key &&
-@@ -467,9 +464,11 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
+@@ -468,9 +465,11 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
return 0;
pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
}
-@@ -542,13 +541,13 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee
+@@ -543,13 +542,13 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee
u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
-@@ -643,7 +642,7 @@ static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
+@@ -646,7 +645,7 @@ static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
u8 *pos;
u8 pn[6];
u64 pn64;
u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
if (info->control.hw_key &&
-@@ -700,8 +699,10 @@ static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
+@@ -703,8 +702,10 @@ static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
pos += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN;
gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
}
ieee80211_tx_result
-@@ -1128,9 +1129,9 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_encrypt(struct
+@@ -1133,9 +1134,9 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_encrypt(struct
struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
return TX_DROP;
-@@ -1176,7 +1177,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct
+@@ -1181,7 +1182,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
static int ieee80211_ifa6_changed(struct notifier_block *nb,
unsigned long data, void *arg)
{
-@@ -1312,14 +1312,14 @@ int ieee80211_register_hw(struct ieee802
+@@ -1315,14 +1315,14 @@ int ieee80211_register_hw(struct ieee802
rtnl_unlock();
local->ifa6_notifier.notifier_call = ieee80211_ifa6_changed;
result = register_inet6addr_notifier(&local->ifa6_notifier);
if (result)
-@@ -1328,13 +1328,13 @@ int ieee80211_register_hw(struct ieee802
+@@ -1331,13 +1331,13 @@ int ieee80211_register_hw(struct ieee802
return 0;
fail_ifa:
#endif
wiphy_unregister(local->hw.wiphy);
-@@ -1362,10 +1362,10 @@ void ieee80211_unregister_hw(struct ieee
+@@ -1365,10 +1365,10 @@ void ieee80211_unregister_hw(struct ieee
tasklet_kill(&local->tx_pending_tasklet);
tasklet_kill(&local->tasklet);
__NL80211_ATTR_AFTER_LAST,
--- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c
-@@ -2729,7 +2729,7 @@ static void ieee80211_report_disconnect(
+@@ -2734,7 +2734,7 @@ static void ieee80211_report_disconnect(
};
if (tx)
else
cfg80211_rx_mlme_mgmt(sdata->dev, buf, len);
-@@ -4719,7 +4719,8 @@ void ieee80211_mgd_quiesce(struct ieee80
+@@ -4724,7 +4724,8 @@ void ieee80211_mgd_quiesce(struct ieee80
if (ifmgd->auth_data)
ieee80211_destroy_auth_data(sdata, false);
cfg80211_tx_mlme_mgmt(sdata->dev, frame_buf,
* @vif: &struct ieee80211_vif pointer from the add_interface callback.
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
-@@ -461,7 +461,9 @@ struct ieee80211_if_managed {
+@@ -450,7 +450,9 @@ struct ieee80211_if_managed {
unsigned long probe_timeout;
int probe_send_count;
bool nullfunc_failed;
struct ieee80211_mgd_auth_data *auth_data;
--- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c
-@@ -2720,7 +2720,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_ap_probereq_get)
+@@ -2725,7 +2725,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_ap_probereq_get)
static void ieee80211_report_disconnect(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
const u8 *buf, size_t len, bool tx,
{
struct ieee80211_event event = {
.type = MLME_EVENT,
-@@ -2729,7 +2729,7 @@ static void ieee80211_report_disconnect(
+@@ -2734,7 +2734,7 @@ static void ieee80211_report_disconnect(
};
if (tx)
else
cfg80211_rx_mlme_mgmt(sdata->dev, buf, len);
-@@ -2751,13 +2751,18 @@ static void __ieee80211_disconnect(struc
+@@ -2756,13 +2756,18 @@ static void __ieee80211_disconnect(struc
tx = !sdata->csa_block_tx;
tx, frame_buf);
mutex_lock(&local->mtx);
sdata->vif.csa_active = false;
-@@ -2770,7 +2775,9 @@ static void __ieee80211_disconnect(struc
+@@ -2775,7 +2780,9 @@ static void __ieee80211_disconnect(struc
mutex_unlock(&local->mtx);
ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, frame_buf, sizeof(frame_buf), tx,
sdata_unlock(sdata);
}
-@@ -2789,6 +2796,13 @@ static void ieee80211_beacon_connection_
+@@ -2794,6 +2801,13 @@ static void ieee80211_beacon_connection_
sdata_info(sdata, "Connection to AP %pM lost\n",
ifmgd->bssid);
__ieee80211_disconnect(sdata);
} else {
ieee80211_mgd_probe_ap(sdata, true);
}
-@@ -2827,6 +2841,21 @@ void ieee80211_connection_loss(struct ie
+@@ -2832,6 +2846,21 @@ void ieee80211_connection_loss(struct ie
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_connection_loss);
static void ieee80211_destroy_auth_data(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
bool assoc)
-@@ -3130,7 +3159,7 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_deauth(str
+@@ -3135,7 +3164,7 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_deauth(str
ieee80211_set_disassoc(sdata, 0, 0, false, NULL);
ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, (u8 *)mgmt, len, false,
return;
}
-@@ -3179,7 +3208,8 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_disassoc(s
+@@ -3184,7 +3213,8 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_disassoc(s
ieee80211_set_disassoc(sdata, 0, 0, false, NULL);
}
static void ieee80211_get_rates(struct ieee80211_supported_band *sband,
-@@ -4199,7 +4229,8 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_beacon(str
+@@ -4204,7 +4234,8 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_beacon(str
true, deauth_buf);
ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, deauth_buf,
sizeof(deauth_buf), true,
return;
}
-@@ -4344,7 +4375,7 @@ static void ieee80211_sta_connection_los
+@@ -4349,7 +4380,7 @@ static void ieee80211_sta_connection_los
tx, frame_buf);
ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, frame_buf, sizeof(frame_buf), true,
}
static int ieee80211_auth(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
-@@ -5434,7 +5465,8 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_auth(struct ieee80211_
+@@ -5439,7 +5470,8 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_auth(struct ieee80211_
ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, frame_buf,
sizeof(frame_buf), true,
}
sdata_info(sdata, "authenticate with %pM\n", req->bss->bssid);
-@@ -5506,7 +5538,8 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_assoc(struct ieee80211
+@@ -5511,7 +5543,8 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_assoc(struct ieee80211
ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, frame_buf,
sizeof(frame_buf), true,
}
if (ifmgd->auth_data && !ifmgd->auth_data->done) {
-@@ -5805,7 +5838,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_deauth(struct ieee8021
+@@ -5810,7 +5843,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_deauth(struct ieee8021
ieee80211_destroy_auth_data(sdata, false);
ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, frame_buf,
sizeof(frame_buf), true,
return 0;
}
-@@ -5825,7 +5858,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_deauth(struct ieee8021
+@@ -5830,7 +5863,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_deauth(struct ieee8021
ieee80211_destroy_assoc_data(sdata, false, true);
ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, frame_buf,
sizeof(frame_buf), true,
return 0;
}
-@@ -5840,7 +5873,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_deauth(struct ieee8021
+@@ -5845,7 +5878,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_deauth(struct ieee8021
req->reason_code, tx, frame_buf);
ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, frame_buf,
sizeof(frame_buf), true,
return 0;
}
-@@ -5873,7 +5906,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_disassoc(struct ieee80
+@@ -5878,7 +5911,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_disassoc(struct ieee80
frame_buf);
ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, frame_buf, sizeof(frame_buf), true,
static int fq_init(struct fq *fq, int flows_cnt)
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
-@@ -857,7 +857,6 @@ enum txq_info_flags {
+@@ -846,7 +846,6 @@ enum txq_info_flags {
*/
struct txq_info {
struct fq_tin tin;
#endif /* __MAC80211_DRIVER_OPS */
--- a/net/mac80211/iface.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/iface.c
-@@ -839,7 +839,7 @@ static const struct net_device_ops ieee8
+@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ static const struct net_device_ops ieee8
};
{
switch (iftype) {
/* P2P GO and client are mapped to AP/STATION types */
-@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ static bool ieee80211_set_sdata_offload_
+@@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ static bool ieee80211_set_sdata_offload_
flags = sdata->vif.offload_flags;
if (ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, SUPPORTS_TX_ENCAP_OFFLOAD) &&
flags |= IEEE80211_OFFLOAD_ENCAP_ENABLED;
if (!ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, SUPPORTS_TX_FRAG) &&
-@@ -872,10 +872,21 @@ static bool ieee80211_set_sdata_offload_
+@@ -868,10 +868,21 @@ static bool ieee80211_set_sdata_offload_
flags &= ~IEEE80211_OFFLOAD_ENCAP_ENABLED;
}
return true;
}
-@@ -893,7 +904,7 @@ static void ieee80211_set_vif_encap_ops(
+@@ -889,7 +900,7 @@ static void ieee80211_set_vif_encap_ops(
}
if (!ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, SUPPORTS_TX_ENCAP_OFFLOAD) ||
enabled = bss->vif.offload_flags & IEEE80211_OFFLOAD_ENCAP_ENABLED;
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
-@@ -4114,7 +4114,9 @@ void ieee80211_check_fast_rx(struct sta_
+@@ -4198,7 +4198,9 @@ void ieee80211_check_fast_rx(struct sta_
.vif_type = sdata->vif.type,
.control_port_protocol = sdata->control_port_protocol,
}, *old, *new = NULL;
/* use sparse to check that we don't return without updating */
__acquire(check_fast_rx);
-@@ -4227,6 +4229,17 @@ void ieee80211_check_fast_rx(struct sta_
+@@ -4311,6 +4313,17 @@ void ieee80211_check_fast_rx(struct sta_
if (assign)
new = kmemdup(&fastrx, sizeof(fastrx), GFP_KERNEL);
spin_lock_bh(&sta->lock);
old = rcu_dereference_protected(sta->fast_rx, true);
rcu_assign_pointer(sta->fast_rx, new);
-@@ -4273,6 +4286,108 @@ void ieee80211_check_fast_rx_iface(struc
+@@ -4357,6 +4370,108 @@ void ieee80211_check_fast_rx_iface(struc
mutex_unlock(&local->sta_mtx);
}
static bool ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx,
struct ieee80211_fast_rx *fast_rx)
{
-@@ -4293,9 +4408,6 @@ static bool ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx(str
+@@ -4377,9 +4492,6 @@ static bool ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx(str
} addrs __aligned(2);
struct ieee80211_sta_rx_stats *stats = &sta->rx_stats;
/* for parallel-rx, we need to have DUP_VALIDATED, otherwise we write
* to a common data structure; drivers can implement that per queue
* but we don't have that information in mac80211
-@@ -4369,32 +4481,6 @@ static bool ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx(str
+@@ -4453,32 +4565,6 @@ static bool ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx(str
pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - fast_rx->icv_len))
goto drop;
if (rx->key && !ieee80211_has_protected(hdr->frame_control))
goto drop;
-@@ -4406,12 +4492,6 @@ static bool ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx(str
+@@ -4490,12 +4576,6 @@ static bool ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx(str
return true;
}
/* do the header conversion - first grab the addresses */
ether_addr_copy(addrs.da, skb->data + fast_rx->da_offs);
ether_addr_copy(addrs.sa, skb->data + fast_rx->sa_offs);
-@@ -4420,62 +4500,14 @@ static bool ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx(str
+@@ -4504,62 +4584,14 @@ static bool ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx(str
/* push the addresses in front */
memcpy(skb_push(skb, sizeof(addrs)), &addrs, sizeof(addrs));
stats->dropped++;
return true;
}
-@@ -4529,6 +4561,47 @@ static bool ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_han
+@@ -4613,6 +4645,47 @@ static bool ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_han
return true;
}
/*
* This is the actual Rx frames handler. as it belongs to Rx path it must
* be called with rcu_read_lock protection.
-@@ -4766,15 +4839,20 @@ void ieee80211_rx_list(struct ieee80211_
+@@ -4850,15 +4923,20 @@ void ieee80211_rx_list(struct ieee80211_
* if it was previously present.
* Also, frames with less than 16 bytes are dropped.
*/
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
-@@ -1600,13 +1600,8 @@ ieee80211_have_rx_timestamp(struct ieee8
+@@ -1587,13 +1587,8 @@ ieee80211_have_rx_timestamp(struct ieee8
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(status->flag & RX_FLAG_MACTIME_START &&
status->flag & RX_FLAG_MACTIME_END);
+++ /dev/null
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
-Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:42 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: assure all fragments are encrypted
-
-Do not mix plaintext and encrypted fragments in protected Wi-Fi
-networks. This fixes CVE-2020-26147.
-
-Previously, an attacker was able to first forward a legitimate encrypted
-fragment towards a victim, followed by a plaintext fragment. The
-encrypted and plaintext fragment would then be reassembled. For further
-details see Section 6.3 and Appendix D in the paper "Fragment and Forge:
-Breaking Wi-Fi Through Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation".
-
-Because of this change there are now two equivalent conditions in the
-code to determine if a received fragment requires sequential PNs, so we
-also move this test to a separate function to make the code easier to
-maintain.
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
-Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
----
-
---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
-+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
-@@ -2204,6 +2204,16 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee802
- return NULL;
- }
-
-+static bool requires_sequential_pn(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, __le16 fc)
-+{
-+ return rx->key &&
-+ (rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP ||
-+ rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256 ||
-+ rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP ||
-+ rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256) &&
-+ ieee80211_has_protected(fc);
-+}
-+
- static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline
- ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
- {
-@@ -2248,12 +2258,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
- /* This is the first fragment of a new frame. */
- entry = ieee80211_reassemble_add(rx->sdata, frag, seq,
- rx->seqno_idx, &(rx->skb));
-- if (rx->key &&
-- (rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP ||
-- rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256 ||
-- rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP ||
-- rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256) &&
-- ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) {
-+ if (requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc)) {
- int queue = rx->security_idx;
-
- /* Store CCMP/GCMP PN so that we can verify that the
-@@ -2295,11 +2300,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
- u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN], *rpn;
- int queue;
-
-- if (!rx->key ||
-- (rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP &&
-- rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256 &&
-- rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP &&
-- rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256))
-+ if (!requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc))
- return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
- memcpy(pn, entry->last_pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
- for (i = IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+++ /dev/null
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
-Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:43 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks
-
-Simultaneously prevent mixed key attacks (CVE-2020-24587) and fragment
-cache attacks (CVE-2020-24586). This is accomplished by assigning a
-unique color to every key (per interface) and using this to track which
-key was used to decrypt a fragment. When reassembling frames, it is
-now checked whether all fragments were decrypted using the same key.
-
-To assure that fragment cache attacks are also prevented, the ID that is
-assigned to keys is unique even over (re)associations and (re)connects.
-This means fragments separated by a (re)association or (re)connect will
-not be reassembled. Because mac80211 now also prevents the reassembly of
-mixed encrypted and plaintext fragments, all cache attacks are prevented.
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
-Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
----
-
---- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
-+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
-@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry {
- u8 rx_queue;
- bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
- u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */
-+ unsigned int key_color;
- };
-
-
---- a/net/mac80211/key.c
-+++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
-@@ -799,6 +799,7 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_
- struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
- struct sta_info *sta)
- {
-+ static atomic_t key_color = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
- struct ieee80211_key *old_key;
- int idx = key->conf.keyidx;
- bool pairwise = key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE;
-@@ -850,6 +851,12 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_
- key->sdata = sdata;
- key->sta = sta;
-
-+ /*
-+ * Assign a unique ID to every key so we can easily prevent mixed
-+ * key and fragment cache attacks.
-+ */
-+ key->color = atomic_inc_return(&key_color);
-+
- increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
-
- ret = ieee80211_key_replace(sdata, sta, pairwise, old_key, key);
---- a/net/mac80211/key.h
-+++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
-@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
- } debugfs;
- #endif
-
-+ unsigned int color;
-+
- /*
- * key config, must be last because it contains key
- * material as variable length member
---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
-+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
-@@ -2265,6 +2265,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
- * next fragment has a sequential PN value.
- */
- entry->check_sequential_pn = true;
-+ entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
- memcpy(entry->last_pn,
- rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue],
- IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
-@@ -2302,6 +2303,11 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
-
- if (!requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc))
- return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
-+
-+ /* Prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks */
-+ if (entry->key_color != rx->key->color)
-+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
-+
- memcpy(pn, entry->last_pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
- for (i = IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- pn[i]++;
+++ /dev/null
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
-Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:44 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: properly handle A-MSDUs that start with an
- RFC 1042 header
-
-Properly parse A-MSDUs whose first 6 bytes happen to equal a rfc1042
-header. This can occur in practice when the destination MAC address
-equals AA:AA:03:00:00:00. More importantly, this simplifies the next
-patch to mitigate A-MSDU injection attacks.
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
-Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
----
-
---- a/include/net/cfg80211.h
-+++ b/include/net/cfg80211.h
-@@ -5628,7 +5628,7 @@ unsigned int ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen(s
- */
- int ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ethhdr *ehdr,
- const u8 *addr, enum nl80211_iftype iftype,
-- u8 data_offset);
-+ u8 data_offset, bool is_amsdu);
-
- /**
- * ieee80211_data_to_8023 - convert an 802.11 data frame to 802.3
-@@ -5640,7 +5640,7 @@ int ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(struct
- static inline int ieee80211_data_to_8023(struct sk_buff *skb, const u8 *addr,
- enum nl80211_iftype iftype)
- {
-- return ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(skb, NULL, addr, iftype, 0);
-+ return ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(skb, NULL, addr, iftype, 0, false);
- }
-
- /**
---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
-+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
-@@ -2696,7 +2696,7 @@ __ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(struct ieee80211_
- if (ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(skb, ðhdr,
- rx->sdata->vif.addr,
- rx->sdata->vif.type,
-- data_offset))
-+ data_offset, true))
- return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
-
- ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(skb, &frame_list, dev->dev_addr,
---- a/net/wireless/util.c
-+++ b/net/wireless/util.c
-@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen)
-
- int ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ethhdr *ehdr,
- const u8 *addr, enum nl80211_iftype iftype,
-- u8 data_offset)
-+ u8 data_offset, bool is_amsdu)
- {
- struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
- struct {
-@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ int ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(struct
- skb_copy_bits(skb, hdrlen, &payload, sizeof(payload));
- tmp.h_proto = payload.proto;
-
-- if (likely((ether_addr_equal(payload.hdr, rfc1042_header) &&
-+ if (likely((!is_amsdu && ether_addr_equal(payload.hdr, rfc1042_header) &&
- tmp.h_proto != htons(ETH_P_AARP) &&
- tmp.h_proto != htons(ETH_P_IPX)) ||
- ether_addr_equal(payload.hdr, bridge_tunnel_header)))
+++ /dev/null
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
-Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:45 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] cfg80211: mitigate A-MSDU aggregation attacks
-
-Mitigate A-MSDU injection attacks (CVE-2020-24588) by detecting if the
-destination address of a subframe equals an RFC1042 (i.e., LLC/SNAP)
-header, and if so dropping the complete A-MSDU frame. This mitigates
-known attacks, although new (unknown) aggregation-based attacks may
-remain possible.
-
-This defense works because in A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, a
-normal encrypted Wi-Fi frame is turned into an A-MSDU frame. This means
-the first 6 bytes of the first A-MSDU subframe correspond to an RFC1042
-header. In other words, the destination MAC address of the first A-MSDU
-subframe contains the start of an RFC1042 header during an aggregation
-attack. We can detect this and thereby prevent this specific attack.
-For details, see Section 7.2 of "Fragment and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi
-Through Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation".
-
-Note that for kernel 4.9 and above this patch depends on "mac80211:
-properly handle A-MSDUs that start with a rfc1042 header". Otherwise
-this patch has no impact and attacks will remain possible.
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
-Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
----
-
---- a/net/wireless/util.c
-+++ b/net/wireless/util.c
-@@ -775,6 +775,9 @@ void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_
- remaining = skb->len - offset;
- if (subframe_len > remaining)
- goto purge;
-+ /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks */
-+ if (ether_addr_equal(eth.h_dest, rfc1042_header))
-+ goto purge;
-
- offset += sizeof(struct ethhdr);
- last = remaining <= subframe_len + padding;
+++ /dev/null
-From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:46 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: drop A-MSDUs on old ciphers
-
-With old ciphers (WEP and TKIP) we shouldn't be using A-MSDUs
-since A-MSDUs are only supported if we know that they are, and
-the only practical way for that is HT support which doesn't
-support old ciphers.
-
-However, we would normally accept them anyway. Since we check
-the MMIC before deaggregating A-MSDUs, and the A-MSDU bit in
-the QoS header is not protected in TKIP (or WEP), this enables
-attacks similar to CVE-2020-24588. To prevent that, drop A-MSDUs
-completely with old ciphers.
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
----
-
---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
-+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
-@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
- * Copyright 2007-2010 Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
- * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH
- * Copyright(c) 2015 - 2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH
-- * Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Intel Corporation
-+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Intel Corporation
- */
-
- #include <linux/jiffies.h>
-@@ -2753,6 +2753,23 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(struct ieee80211_rx
- if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1))
- return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
-
-+ if (rx->key) {
-+ /*
-+ * We should not receive A-MSDUs on pre-HT connections,
-+ * and HT connections cannot use old ciphers. Thus drop
-+ * them, as in those cases we couldn't even have SPP
-+ * A-MSDUs or such.
-+ */
-+ switch (rx->key->conf.cipher) {
-+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
-+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
-+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
-+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
-+ default:
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
- return __ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(rx, 0);
- }
-
+++ /dev/null
-From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:47 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: add fragment cache to sta_info
-
-Prior patches protected against fragmentation cache attacks
-by coloring keys, but this shows that it can lead to issues
-when multiple stations use the same sequence number. Add a
-fragment cache to struct sta_info (in addition to the one in
-the interface) to separate fragments for different stations
-properly.
-
-This then automatically clear most of the fragment cache when a
-station disconnects (or reassociates) from an AP, or when client
-interfaces disconnect from the network, etc.
-
-On the way, also fix the comment there since this brings us in line
-with the recommendation in 802.11-2016 ("An AP should support ...").
-Additionally, remove a useless condition (since there's no problem
-purging an already empty list).
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
----
-
---- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
-+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
-@@ -50,12 +50,6 @@ struct ieee80211_local;
- #define IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_HEADROOM 8
- #define IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM 18
-
--/* IEEE 802.11 (Ch. 9.5 Defragmentation) requires support for concurrent
-- * reception of at least three fragmented frames. This limit can be increased
-- * by changing this define, at the cost of slower frame reassembly and
-- * increased memory use (about 2 kB of RAM per entry). */
--#define IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX 4
--
- /* power level hasn't been configured (or set to automatic) */
- #define IEEE80211_UNSET_POWER_LEVEL INT_MIN
-
-@@ -88,19 +82,6 @@ extern const u8 ieee80211_ac_to_qos_mask
-
- #define IEEE80211_MAX_NAN_INSTANCE_ID 255
-
--struct ieee80211_fragment_entry {
-- struct sk_buff_head skb_list;
-- unsigned long first_frag_time;
-- u16 seq;
-- u16 extra_len;
-- u16 last_frag;
-- u8 rx_queue;
-- bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
-- u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */
-- unsigned int key_color;
--};
--
--
- struct ieee80211_bss {
- u32 device_ts_beacon, device_ts_presp;
-
-@@ -912,9 +893,7 @@ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data {
-
- char name[IFNAMSIZ];
-
-- /* Fragment table for host-based reassembly */
-- struct ieee80211_fragment_entry fragments[IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX];
-- unsigned int fragment_next;
-+ struct ieee80211_fragment_cache frags;
-
- /* TID bitmap for NoAck policy */
- u16 noack_map;
-@@ -2329,4 +2308,7 @@ u32 ieee80211_calc_expected_tx_airtime(s
- #define debug_noinline
- #endif
-
-+void ieee80211_init_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache);
-+void ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache);
-+
- #endif /* IEEE80211_I_H */
---- a/net/mac80211/iface.c
-+++ b/net/mac80211/iface.c
-@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
- * Copyright 2008, Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
- * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH
- * Copyright (c) 2016 Intel Deutschland GmbH
-- * Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Intel Corporation
-+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Intel Corporation
- */
- #include <linux/slab.h>
- #include <linux/kernel.h>
-@@ -679,16 +679,12 @@ static void ieee80211_set_multicast_list
- */
- static void ieee80211_teardown_sdata(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
- {
-- int i;
--
- /* free extra data */
- ieee80211_free_keys(sdata, false);
-
- ieee80211_debugfs_remove_netdev(sdata);
-
-- for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX; i++)
-- __skb_queue_purge(&sdata->fragments[i].skb_list);
-- sdata->fragment_next = 0;
-+ ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(&sdata->frags);
-
- if (ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&sdata->vif))
- ieee80211_mesh_teardown_sdata(sdata);
-@@ -2038,8 +2034,7 @@ int ieee80211_if_add(struct ieee80211_lo
- sdata->wdev.wiphy = local->hw.wiphy;
- sdata->local = local;
-
-- for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX; i++)
-- skb_queue_head_init(&sdata->fragments[i].skb_list);
-+ ieee80211_init_frag_cache(&sdata->frags);
-
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sdata->key_list);
-
---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
-+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
-@@ -2133,19 +2133,34 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_
- return result;
- }
-
-+void ieee80211_init_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache)
-+{
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cache->entries); i++)
-+ skb_queue_head_init(&cache->entries[i].skb_list);
-+}
-+
-+void ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache)
-+{
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cache->entries); i++)
-+ __skb_queue_purge(&cache->entries[i].skb_list);
-+}
-+
- static inline struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *
--ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
-+ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache,
- unsigned int frag, unsigned int seq, int rx_queue,
- struct sk_buff **skb)
- {
- struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry;
-
-- entry = &sdata->fragments[sdata->fragment_next++];
-- if (sdata->fragment_next >= IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX)
-- sdata->fragment_next = 0;
-+ entry = &cache->entries[cache->next++];
-+ if (cache->next >= IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX)
-+ cache->next = 0;
-
-- if (!skb_queue_empty(&entry->skb_list))
-- __skb_queue_purge(&entry->skb_list);
-+ __skb_queue_purge(&entry->skb_list);
-
- __skb_queue_tail(&entry->skb_list, *skb); /* no need for locking */
- *skb = NULL;
-@@ -2160,14 +2175,14 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee8021
- }
-
- static inline struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *
--ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
-+ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache,
- unsigned int frag, unsigned int seq,
- int rx_queue, struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr)
- {
- struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry;
- int i, idx;
-
-- idx = sdata->fragment_next;
-+ idx = cache->next;
- for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX; i++) {
- struct ieee80211_hdr *f_hdr;
- struct sk_buff *f_skb;
-@@ -2176,7 +2191,7 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee802
- if (idx < 0)
- idx = IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX - 1;
-
-- entry = &sdata->fragments[idx];
-+ entry = &cache->entries[idx];
- if (skb_queue_empty(&entry->skb_list) || entry->seq != seq ||
- entry->rx_queue != rx_queue ||
- entry->last_frag + 1 != frag)
-@@ -2217,6 +2232,7 @@ static bool requires_sequential_pn(struc
- static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline
- ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
- {
-+ struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache = &rx->sdata->frags;
- struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
- u16 sc;
- __le16 fc;
-@@ -2238,6 +2254,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
- goto out_no_led;
- }
-
-+ if (rx->sta)
-+ cache = &rx->sta->frags;
-+
- if (likely(!ieee80211_has_morefrags(fc) && frag == 0))
- goto out;
-
-@@ -2256,7 +2275,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
-
- if (frag == 0) {
- /* This is the first fragment of a new frame. */
-- entry = ieee80211_reassemble_add(rx->sdata, frag, seq,
-+ entry = ieee80211_reassemble_add(cache, frag, seq,
- rx->seqno_idx, &(rx->skb));
- if (requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc)) {
- int queue = rx->security_idx;
-@@ -2284,7 +2303,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
- /* This is a fragment for a frame that should already be pending in
- * fragment cache. Add this fragment to the end of the pending entry.
- */
-- entry = ieee80211_reassemble_find(rx->sdata, frag, seq,
-+ entry = ieee80211_reassemble_find(cache, frag, seq,
- rx->seqno_idx, hdr);
- if (!entry) {
- I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->rx_handlers_drop_defrag);
---- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
-+++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
-@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
- * Copyright 2006-2007 Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz>
- * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH
- * Copyright (C) 2015 - 2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH
-- * Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Intel Corporation
-+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Intel Corporation
- */
-
- #include <linux/module.h>
-@@ -393,6 +393,8 @@ struct sta_info *sta_info_alloc(struct i
-
- u64_stats_init(&sta->rx_stats.syncp);
-
-+ ieee80211_init_frag_cache(&sta->frags);
-+
- sta->sta_state = IEEE80211_STA_NONE;
-
- /* Mark TID as unreserved */
-@@ -1103,6 +1105,8 @@ static void __sta_info_destroy_part2(str
-
- ieee80211_sta_debugfs_remove(sta);
-
-+ ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(&sta->frags);
-+
- cleanup_single_sta(sta);
- }
-
---- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
-+++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
-@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
- * Copyright 2002-2005, Devicescape Software, Inc.
- * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH
- * Copyright(c) 2015-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH
-- * Copyright(c) 2020 Intel Corporation
-+ * Copyright(c) 2020-2021 Intel Corporation
- */
-
- #ifndef STA_INFO_H
-@@ -439,6 +439,33 @@ struct ieee80211_sta_rx_stats {
- };
-
- /*
-+ * IEEE 802.11-2016 (10.6 "Defragmentation") recommends support for "concurrent
-+ * reception of at least one MSDU per access category per associated STA"
-+ * on APs, or "at least one MSDU per access category" on other interface types.
-+ *
-+ * This limit can be increased by changing this define, at the cost of slower
-+ * frame reassembly and increased memory use while fragments are pending.
-+ */
-+#define IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX 4
-+
-+struct ieee80211_fragment_entry {
-+ struct sk_buff_head skb_list;
-+ unsigned long first_frag_time;
-+ u16 seq;
-+ u16 extra_len;
-+ u16 last_frag;
-+ u8 rx_queue;
-+ bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
-+ u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */
-+ unsigned int key_color;
-+};
-+
-+struct ieee80211_fragment_cache {
-+ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry entries[IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX];
-+ unsigned int next;
-+};
-+
-+/*
- * The bandwidth threshold below which the per-station CoDel parameters will be
- * scaled to be more lenient (to prevent starvation of slow stations). This
- * value will be scaled by the number of active stations when it is being
-@@ -531,6 +558,7 @@ struct ieee80211_sta_rx_stats {
- * @status_stats.last_ack_signal: last ACK signal
- * @status_stats.ack_signal_filled: last ACK signal validity
- * @status_stats.avg_ack_signal: average ACK signal
-+ * @frags: fragment cache
- */
- struct sta_info {
- /* General information, mostly static */
-@@ -639,6 +667,8 @@ struct sta_info {
-
- struct cfg80211_chan_def tdls_chandef;
-
-+ struct ieee80211_fragment_cache frags;
-+
- /* keep last! */
- struct ieee80211_sta sta;
- };
+++ /dev/null
-From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:48 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: check defrag PN against current frame
-
-As pointed out by Mathy Vanhoef, we implement the RX PN check
-on fragmented frames incorrectly - we check against the last
-received PN prior to the new frame, rather than to the one in
-this frame itself.
-
-Prior patches addressed the security issue here, but in order
-to be able to reason better about the code, fix it to really
-compare against the current frame's PN, not the last stored
-one.
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
----
-
---- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
-+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
-@@ -227,8 +227,15 @@ struct ieee80211_rx_data {
- */
- int security_idx;
-
-- u32 tkip_iv32;
-- u16 tkip_iv16;
-+ union {
-+ struct {
-+ u32 iv32;
-+ u16 iv16;
-+ } tkip;
-+ struct {
-+ u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
-+ } ccm_gcm;
-+ };
- };
-
- struct ieee80211_csa_settings {
---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
-+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
-@@ -2318,7 +2318,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
- if (entry->check_sequential_pn) {
- int i;
- u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN], *rpn;
-- int queue;
-
- if (!requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc))
- return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
-@@ -2333,8 +2332,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
- if (pn[i])
- break;
- }
-- queue = rx->security_idx;
-- rpn = rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue];
-+
-+ rpn = rx->ccm_gcm.pn;
- if (memcmp(pn, rpn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN))
- return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
- memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
---- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
-+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
-@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
- * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
- * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH
-+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2021 Intel Corporation
- */
-
- #include <linux/netdevice.h>
-@@ -167,8 +168,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct
-
- update_iv:
- /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
-- rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
-- rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
-+ rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip.iv32;
-+ rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip.iv16;
-
- return RX_CONTINUE;
-
-@@ -294,8 +295,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct iee
- key, skb->data + hdrlen,
- skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
- hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
-- &rx->tkip_iv32,
-- &rx->tkip_iv16);
-+ &rx->tkip.iv32,
-+ &rx->tkip.iv16);
- if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
- return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
-
-@@ -552,6 +553,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee
- }
-
- memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
-+ if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr)))
-+ memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
- }
-
- /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
-@@ -782,6 +785,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct iee
- }
-
- memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
-+ if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr)))
-+ memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
- }
-
- /* Remove GCMP header and MIC */
+++ /dev/null
-From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:49 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: prevent attacks on TKIP/WEP as well
-
-Similar to the issues fixed in previous patches, TKIP and WEP
-should be protected even if for TKIP we have the Michael MIC
-protecting it, and WEP is broken anyway.
-
-However, this also somewhat protects potential other algorithms
-that drivers might implement.
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
----
-
---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
-+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
-@@ -2284,6 +2284,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
- * next fragment has a sequential PN value.
- */
- entry->check_sequential_pn = true;
-+ entry->is_protected = true;
- entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
- memcpy(entry->last_pn,
- rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue],
-@@ -2296,6 +2297,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
- sizeof(rx->key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue]));
- BUILD_BUG_ON(IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN !=
- IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
-+ } else if (rx->key && ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) {
-+ entry->is_protected = true;
-+ entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
- }
- return RX_QUEUED;
- }
-@@ -2337,6 +2341,14 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
- if (memcmp(pn, rpn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN))
- return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
- memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
-+ } else if (entry->is_protected &&
-+ (!rx->key || !ieee80211_has_protected(fc) ||
-+ rx->key->color != entry->key_color)) {
-+ /* Drop this as a mixed key or fragment cache attack, even
-+ * if for TKIP Michael MIC should protect us, and WEP is a
-+ * lost cause anyway.
-+ */
-+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
- }
-
- skb_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc));
---- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
-+++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
-@@ -455,7 +455,8 @@ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry {
- u16 extra_len;
- u16 last_frag;
- u8 rx_queue;
-- bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
-+ u8 check_sequential_pn:1, /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
-+ is_protected:1;
- u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */
- unsigned int key_color;
- };
+++ /dev/null
-From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
-Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:50 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: do not accept/forward invalid EAPOL frames
-
-EAPOL frames are used for authentication and key management between the
-AP and each individual STA associated in the BSS. Those frames are not
-supposed to be sent by one associated STA to another associated STA
-(either unicast for broadcast/multicast).
-
-Similarly, in 802.11 they're supposed to be sent to the authenticator
-(AP) address.
-
-Since it is possible for unexpected EAPOL frames to result in misbehavior
-in supplicant implementations, it is better for the AP to not allow such
-cases to be forwarded to other clients either directly, or indirectly if
-the AP interface is part of a bridge.
-
-Accept EAPOL (control port) frames only if they're transmitted to the
-own address, or, due to interoperability concerns, to the PAE group
-address.
-
-Disable forwarding of EAPOL (or well, the configured control port
-protocol) frames back to wireless medium in all cases. Previously, these
-frames were accepted from fully authenticated and authorized stations
-and also from unauthenticated stations for one of the cases.
-
-Additionally, to avoid forwarding by the bridge, rewrite the PAE group
-address case to the local MAC address.
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Co-developed-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
-Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
----
-
---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
-+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
-@@ -2541,13 +2541,13 @@ static bool ieee80211_frame_allowed(stru
- struct ethhdr *ehdr = (struct ethhdr *) rx->skb->data;
-
- /*
-- * Allow EAPOL frames to us/the PAE group address regardless
-- * of whether the frame was encrypted or not.
-+ * Allow EAPOL frames to us/the PAE group address regardless of
-+ * whether the frame was encrypted or not, and always disallow
-+ * all other destination addresses for them.
- */
-- if (ehdr->h_proto == rx->sdata->control_port_protocol &&
-- (ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, rx->sdata->vif.addr) ||
-- ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, pae_group_addr)))
-- return true;
-+ if (unlikely(ehdr->h_proto == rx->sdata->control_port_protocol))
-+ return ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, rx->sdata->vif.addr) ||
-+ ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, pae_group_addr);
-
- if (ieee80211_802_1x_port_control(rx) ||
- ieee80211_drop_unencrypted(rx, fc))
-@@ -2572,8 +2572,28 @@ static void ieee80211_deliver_skb_to_loc
- cfg80211_rx_control_port(dev, skb, noencrypt);
- dev_kfree_skb(skb);
- } else {
-+ struct ethhdr *ehdr = (void *)skb_mac_header(skb);
-+
- memset(skb->cb, 0, sizeof(skb->cb));
-
-+ /*
-+ * 802.1X over 802.11 requires that the authenticator address
-+ * be used for EAPOL frames. However, 802.1X allows the use of
-+ * the PAE group address instead. If the interface is part of
-+ * a bridge and we pass the frame with the PAE group address,
-+ * then the bridge will forward it to the network (even if the
-+ * client was not associated yet), which isn't supposed to
-+ * happen.
-+ * To avoid that, rewrite the destination address to our own
-+ * address, so that the authenticator (e.g. hostapd) will see
-+ * the frame, but bridge won't forward it anywhere else. Note
-+ * that due to earlier filtering, the only other address can
-+ * be the PAE group address.
-+ */
-+ if (unlikely(skb->protocol == sdata->control_port_protocol &&
-+ !ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, sdata->vif.addr)))
-+ ether_addr_copy(ehdr->h_dest, sdata->vif.addr);
-+
- /* deliver to local stack */
- if (rx->list)
- #if LINUX_VERSION_IS_GEQ(4,19,0)
-@@ -2617,6 +2637,7 @@ ieee80211_deliver_skb(struct ieee80211_r
- if ((sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP ||
- sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) &&
- !(sdata->flags & IEEE80211_SDATA_DONT_BRIDGE_PACKETS) &&
-+ ehdr->h_proto != rx->sdata->control_port_protocol &&
- (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN || !sdata->u.vlan.sta)) {
- if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ehdr->h_dest) &&
- ieee80211_vif_get_num_mcast_if(sdata) != 0) {
+++ /dev/null
-From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
-Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:51 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: extend protection against mixed key and
- fragment cache attacks
-
-For some chips/drivers, e.g., QCA6174 with ath10k, the decryption is
-done by the hardware, and the Protected bit in the Frame Control field
-is cleared in the lower level driver before the frame is passed to
-mac80211. In such cases, the condition for ieee80211_has_protected() is
-not met in ieee80211_rx_h_defragment() of mac80211 and the new security
-validation steps are not executed.
-
-Extend mac80211 to cover the case where the Protected bit has been
-cleared, but the frame is indicated as having been decrypted by the
-hardware. This extends protection against mixed key and fragment cache
-attack for additional drivers/chips. This fixes CVE-2020-24586 and
-CVE-2020-24587 for such cases.
-
-Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1
-
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
-Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
----
-
---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
-+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
-@@ -2239,6 +2239,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
- unsigned int frag, seq;
- struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry;
- struct sk_buff *skb;
-+ struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb);
-
- hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
- fc = hdr->frame_control;
-@@ -2297,7 +2298,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
- sizeof(rx->key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue]));
- BUILD_BUG_ON(IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN !=
- IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
-- } else if (rx->key && ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) {
-+ } else if (rx->key &&
-+ (ieee80211_has_protected(fc) ||
-+ (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))) {
- entry->is_protected = true;
- entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
- }
-@@ -2342,13 +2345,19 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
- return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
- memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
- } else if (entry->is_protected &&
-- (!rx->key || !ieee80211_has_protected(fc) ||
-+ (!rx->key ||
-+ (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc) &&
-+ !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) ||
- rx->key->color != entry->key_color)) {
- /* Drop this as a mixed key or fragment cache attack, even
- * if for TKIP Michael MIC should protect us, and WEP is a
- * lost cause anyway.
- */
- return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
-+ } else if (entry->is_protected && rx->key &&
-+ entry->key_color != rx->key->color &&
-+ (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
-+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
- }
-
- skb_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc));
projects / openwrt / openwrt.git / commitdiff