dnsmasq: backport official fix for CVE-2017-13704

Remove LEDE partial fix for CVE-2017-13704.

Backport official fix from upstream.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ldir@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com> (PKG_RELEASE increase)

diff --git a/package/network/services/dnsmasq/Makefile b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/Makefile
index dda11dbfed7376f66e9cfd79d5821c8fd9d8498f..f1413cf5daded8964c1e3ed04415c3a68bf98dec 100644 (file)
--- a/package/network/services/dnsmasq/Makefile
+++ b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/Makefile
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=dnsmasq
 PKG_VERSION:=2.77
 
 PKG_NAME:=dnsmasq
 PKG_VERSION:=2.77

-PKG_RELEASE:=4
+PKG_RELEASE:=5

 
 PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.xz
 PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq/
 
 PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.xz
 PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq/

diff --git a/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/025-backport-fix-CVE-2017-13704.patch b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/025-backport-fix-CVE-2017-13704.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..bba9a08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/025-backport-fix-CVE-2017-13704.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+From 63437ffbb58837b214b4b92cb1c54bc5f3279928 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
+Date: Wed, 6 Sep 2017 22:34:21 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2017-13704, which resulted in a crash on a large DNS
+ query.
+
+A DNS query recieved by UDP which exceeds 512 bytes (or the EDNS0 packet size,
+if different.) is enough to cause SIGSEGV.
+---
+ CHANGELOG     |    7 +++++++
+ src/auth.c    |    5 -----
+ src/forward.c |    8 ++++++++
+ src/rfc1035.c |    5 -----
+ 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
+index 3a640f3..7e65912 100644
+--- a/CHANGELOG
++++ b/CHANGELOG
+@@ -17,6 +17,13 @@ version 2.78
+       --strict-order active. Thanks to Hans Dedecker
+       for the patch
+ 
++      Fix regression in 2.77, ironically added as a security
++      improvement, which resulted in a crash when a DNS
++      query exceeded 512 bytes (or the EDNS0 packet size,
++      if different.) Thanks to Christian Kujau, Arne Woerner
++      Juan Manuel Fernandez and Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant for
++      chasing this one down.  CVE-2017-13704 applies.
++
+       
+ version 2.77
+       Generate an error when configured with a CNAME loop,
+diff --git a/src/auth.c b/src/auth.c
+index 2c24e16..7f95f98 100644
+--- a/src/auth.c
++++ b/src/auth.c
+@@ -119,11 +119,6 @@ size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen, time_t n
+   struct cname *a, *candidate;
+   unsigned int wclen;
+   
+-  /* Clear buffer beyond request to avoid risk of
+-     information disclosure. */
+-  memset(((char *)header) + qlen, 0, 
+-       (limit - ((char *)header)) - qlen);
+-  
+   if (ntohs(header->qdcount) == 0 || OPCODE(header) != QUERY )
+     return 0;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
+index f22556a..e3fa94b 100644
+--- a/src/forward.c
++++ b/src/forward.c
+@@ -1188,6 +1188,10 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen, time_t now)
+       (msg.msg_flags & MSG_TRUNC) ||
+       (header->hb3 & HB3_QR))
+     return;
++
++  /* Clear buffer beyond request to avoid risk of
++     information disclosure. */
++  memset(daemon->packet + n, 0, daemon->edns_pktsz - n);
+   
+   source_addr.sa.sa_family = listen->family;
+   
+@@ -1688,6 +1692,10 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
+   
+       if (size < (int)sizeof(struct dns_header))
+       continue;
++
++      /* Clear buffer beyond request to avoid risk of
++       information disclosure. */
++      memset(payload + size, 0, 65536 - size);
+       
+       query_count++;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
+index 26f5301..af2fe46 100644
+--- a/src/rfc1035.c
++++ b/src/rfc1035.c
+@@ -1223,11 +1223,6 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
+   struct mx_srv_record *rec;
+   size_t len;
+ 
+-  /* Clear buffer beyond request to avoid risk of
+-     information disclosure. */
+-  memset(((char *)header) + qlen, 0, 
+-       (limit - ((char *)header)) - qlen);
+-  
+   if (ntohs(header->ancount) != 0 ||
+       ntohs(header->nscount) != 0 ||
+       ntohs(header->qdcount) == 0 || 
+-- 
+1.7.10.4
+

diff --git a/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/025-fix-CVE-2017-13704.patch b/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/025-fix-CVE-2017-13704.patch
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index 8848131..0000000
--- a/package/network/services/dnsmasq/patches/025-fix-CVE-2017-13704.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From 38af9b1ac3242a4128e88069c495024caa565f0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <kevin@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
-Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 12:35:40 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] forward.c: fix CVE-2017-13704
-
-Fix SIGSEGV in rfc1035.c answer_request() line 1228 where memset()
-is called with header & limit pointing at the same address and thus
-tries to clear memory from before the buffer begins.
-
-answer_request() is called with an invalid edns packet size provided by
-the client.  Ensure the udp_size provided by the client is bounded by
-512 and configured maximum as per RFC 6891 6.2.3 "Values lower than 512
-MUST be treated as equal to 512"
-
-The client that exposed the problem provided a payload udp size of 0.
-
-Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <kevin@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
----
- src/forward.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
-index f22556a..62c5a5a 100644
---- a/src/forward.c
-+++ b/src/forward.c
-@@ -1408,6 +1408,8 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen, time_t now)
-        defaults to 512 */
-       if (udp_size > daemon->edns_pktsz)
-       udp_size = daemon->edns_pktsz;
-+      if (udp_size < 512)
-+      udp_size = 512; /* RFC 6891 6.2.3 */
-     }
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_AUTH
--- 
-2.7.4
-