<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>staging/pepe2k/package/libs, branch v21.02.4</title>
<subtitle>Staging tree of Piotr Dymacz</subtitle>
<id>https://git.openwrt.org/openwrt/staging/pepe2k/atom?h=v21.02.4</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.openwrt.org/openwrt/staging/pepe2k/atom?h=v21.02.4'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.openwrt.org/openwrt/staging/pepe2k/'/>
<updated>2022-10-05T19:09:50Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>treewide: fix security issues by bumping all packages using libwolfssl</title>
<updated>2022-10-05T19:09:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Petr Štetiar</name>
</author>
<published>2022-09-29T16:45:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.openwrt.org/openwrt/staging/pepe2k/commit/?id=8444302a92e601a1e05cb8468aaffa140d5a5b80'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8444302a92e601a1e05cb8468aaffa140d5a5b80</id>
<content type='text'>
As wolfSSL is having hard time maintaining ABI compatibility between
releases, we need to manually force rebuild of packages depending on
libwolfssl and thus force their upgrade. Otherwise due to the ABI
handling we would endup with possibly two libwolfssl libraries in the
system, including the patched libwolfssl-5.5.1, but still have
vulnerable services running using the vulnerable libwolfssl-5.4.0.

So in order to propagate update of libwolfssl to latest stable release
done in commit ec8fb542ec3e4 ("wolfssl: fix TLSv1.3 RCE in uhttpd by
using 5.5.1-stable (CVE-2022-39173)") which fixes several remotely
exploitable vulnerabilities, we need to bump PKG_RELEASE of all
packages using wolfSSL library.

Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar &lt;ynezz@true.cz&gt;
(cherry picked from commit f1b7e1434f66a3cb09cb9e70b40add354a22e458)
(cherry picked from commit 562894b39da381264a34ce31e9334c8a036fa139)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wolfssl: fix TLSv1.3 RCE in uhttpd by using 5.5.1-stable (CVE-2022-39173)</title>
<updated>2022-10-05T19:09:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Petr Štetiar</name>
</author>
<published>2022-09-28T09:28:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.openwrt.org/openwrt/staging/pepe2k/commit/?id=914d91274162ba7e125fcfc781b1128b7c42a856'/>
<id>urn:sha1:914d91274162ba7e125fcfc781b1128b7c42a856</id>
<content type='text'>
Fixes denial of service attack and buffer overflow against TLS 1.3
servers using session ticket resumption. When built with
--enable-session-ticket and making use of TLS 1.3 server code in
wolfSSL, there is the possibility of a malicious client to craft a
malformed second ClientHello packet that causes the server to crash.

This issue is limited to when using both --enable-session-ticket and TLS
1.3 on the server side. Users with TLS 1.3 servers, and having
--enable-session-ticket, should update to the latest version of wolfSSL.

Thanks to Max at Trail of Bits for the report and "LORIA, INRIA, France"
for research on tlspuffin.

Complete release notes https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/releases/tag/v5.5.1-stable

Fixes: CVE-2022-39173
Fixes: https://github.com/openwrt/luci/issues/5962
References: https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/issues/5629
Tested-by: Kien Truong &lt;duckientruong@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Kien Truong &lt;duckientruong@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar &lt;ynezz@true.cz&gt;
(cherry picked from commit ec8fb542ec3e4f584444a97de5ac05dbc2a9cde5)
(cherry picked from commit ce59843662961049a28033077587cabdc5243b15)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wolfssl: bump to 5.5.0</title>
<updated>2022-10-05T19:09:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ivan Pavlov</name>
</author>
<published>2022-08-31T05:04:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.openwrt.org/openwrt/staging/pepe2k/commit/?id=4be7eb7735453a6b1f578942afccc5f742c9d8d8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4be7eb7735453a6b1f578942afccc5f742c9d8d8</id>
<content type='text'>
Remove upstreamed: 101-update-sp_rand_prime-s-preprocessor-gating-to-match.patch

Some low severity vulnerabilities fixed
OpenVPN compatibility fixed (broken in 5.4.0)
Other fixes &amp;&amp; improvements

Signed-off-by: Ivan Pavlov &lt;AuthorReflex@gmail.com&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 3d88f26d74f7771b808082cef541ed8286c40491)
(cherry picked from commit 0c8425bf11590afb0c6f1545b328ecb6ed4aee87)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wolfssl: bump to 5.4.0</title>
<updated>2022-10-05T19:09:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eneas U de Queiroz</name>
</author>
<published>2022-07-15T19:09:58Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.openwrt.org/openwrt/staging/pepe2k/commit/?id=a13dacbfe016b5d047c0496e2ebcf3839a5a5560'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a13dacbfe016b5d047c0496e2ebcf3839a5a5560</id>
<content type='text'>
This version fixes two vulnerabilities:
-CVE-2022-34293[high]: Potential for DTLS DoS attack
-[medium]: Ciphertext side channel attack on ECC and DH operations.

The patch fixing x86 aesni build has been merged upstream.

Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz &lt;cotequeiroz@gmail.com&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 9710fe70a68e0a004b1906db192d7a6c8f810ac5)
Signed-off-by: Christian Marangi &lt;ansuelsmth@gmail.com&gt;
(cherry picked from commit ade7c6db1e6c2c0c8d2338948c37cfa7429ebccc)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wolfssl: bump to v5.3.0-stable</title>
<updated>2022-10-05T19:07:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eneas U de Queiroz</name>
</author>
<published>2022-05-10T19:39:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.openwrt.org/openwrt/staging/pepe2k/commit/?id=049e8f6c1313707d8a029cf75ae097e179799748'/>
<id>urn:sha1:049e8f6c1313707d8a029cf75ae097e179799748</id>
<content type='text'>
This is mostly a bug fix release, including two that were already
patched here:
- 300-fix-SSL_get_verify_result-regression.patch
- 400-wolfcrypt-src-port-devcrypto-devcrypto_aes.c-remove-.patch

Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz &lt;cotequeiroz@gmail.com&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 73c1fe2890baa5c0bfa46f53c5387f5e47de1acb)
(cherry picked from commit 6f8db8fee3b7bd5cb8b1b2be59ee710a8f96860b)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>uclibc++: fix compilation with long file paths</title>
<updated>2022-08-28T05:53:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Alois Klink</name>
</author>
<published>2022-07-09T19:16:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.openwrt.org/openwrt/staging/pepe2k/commit/?id=f5db80a3ab387cc840f5602cc81d3c2028cb7401'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f5db80a3ab387cc840f5602cc81d3c2028cb7401</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently, uClic++ 0.2.5 fails to compile when using a long filepath.

For example, if the openwrt directory is in the path:
/tmp/this_directory_name_is_very_long/more_long_paths/.../openwrt,
then uclibc++ will cause a very obtuse error.

Although the uclibc++ makefiles do print a "File name too long" error,
it's not the final error that's printed, so it's a bit confusing:

&gt; /bin/sh: 1:
&gt; cannot create src/abi/libsupc/&lt;SNIP&gt;_libsupc++.a.dep: File name too long
&gt; &lt;SNIP: some other makefile output here&gt;
&gt; array_type_info.o: No such file or directory

Although OpenWRT 22.03 and current master branch have removed uClib++,
I thought I'd make a PR for OpenWRT 21.02, since I encountered it
and there seems to be quite a few other people experiencing the same issue.
It especially happens when using the SDK, (or when using an encrypted fs)
since the pre-packaged SDKs have very long filenames.

This patch is already in upstream [1], but has not yet been released.

[1]: https://git.busybox.net/uClibc++/commit/?id=6687fc9276fa52defaf8592f2001c19b826aec93

Signed-off-by: Alois Klink &lt;alois@aloisklink.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>zlib: backport null dereference fix</title>
<updated>2022-08-09T06:15:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Petr Štetiar</name>
</author>
<published>2022-08-09T05:50:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.openwrt.org/openwrt/staging/pepe2k/commit/?id=b93327c4692e605649ff1afade98899a9c4aa1ca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b93327c4692e605649ff1afade98899a9c4aa1ca</id>
<content type='text'>
The curl developers found test case that crashed in their testing when
using zlib patched against CVE-2022-37434, same patch we've backported
in commit 7df6795d4c25 ("zlib: backport fix for heap-based buffer
over-read (CVE-2022-37434)"). So we need to backport following patch in
order to fix issue introduced in that previous CVE-2022-37434 fix.

References: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9271
Fixes: 7df6795d4c25 ("zlib: backport fix for heap-based buffer over-read (CVE-2022-37434)")
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar &lt;ynezz@true.cz&gt;
(cherry picked from commit f443e9de7003c00a935b9ea12f168e09e83b48cd)
(cherry picked from commit 707ec48ab3db6d08bd022df1bc720aee68b3b99d)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>zlib: backport fix for heap-based buffer over-read (CVE-2022-37434)</title>
<updated>2022-08-08T08:00:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Petr Štetiar</name>
</author>
<published>2022-08-06T12:55:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.openwrt.org/openwrt/staging/pepe2k/commit/?id=5f189f2f333b25aec20bbf4cc9d5d8ca488ec895'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5f189f2f333b25aec20bbf4cc9d5d8ca488ec895</id>
<content type='text'>
zlib through 1.2.12 has a heap-based buffer over-read or buffer overflow
in inflate in inflate.c via a large gzip header extra field. NOTE: only
applications that call inflateGetHeader are affected. Some common
applications bundle the affected zlib source code but may be unable to
call inflateGetHeader.

Fixes: CVE-2022-37434
References: https://github.com/ivd38/zlib_overflow
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar &lt;ynezz@true.cz&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 7df6795d4c25447683fd4b4a4813bebcddaea547)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openssl: bump to 1.1.1q</title>
<updated>2022-07-17T12:27:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dustin Lundquist</name>
</author>
<published>2022-07-06T16:08:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.openwrt.org/openwrt/staging/pepe2k/commit/?id=6f89233c41ae8af4537e64684fa274ab4a21e9d4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6f89233c41ae8af4537e64684fa274ab4a21e9d4</id>
<content type='text'>
Changes between 1.1.1p and 1.1.1q [5 Jul 2022]

  *) AES OCB mode for 32-bit x86 platforms using the AES-NI assembly optimised
     implementation would not encrypt the entirety of the data under some
     circumstances.  This could reveal sixteen bytes of data that was
     preexisting in the memory that wasn't written.  In the special case of
     "in place" encryption, sixteen bytes of the plaintext would be revealed.

     Since OpenSSL does not support OCB based cipher suites for TLS and DTLS,
     they are both unaffected.
     (CVE-2022-2097)
     [Alex Chernyakhovsky, David Benjamin, Alejandro Sedeño]

Signed-off-by: Dustin Lundquist &lt;dustin@null-ptr.net&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 3899f68b54b31de4b4fef4f575f7ea56dc93d965)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openssl: bump to 1.1.1p</title>
<updated>2022-07-15T13:52:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andre Heider</name>
</author>
<published>2022-06-23T07:08:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.openwrt.org/openwrt/staging/pepe2k/commit/?id=2039c0477bf2d4ff2b89e7dc6263b99e98ac0978'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2039c0477bf2d4ff2b89e7dc6263b99e98ac0978</id>
<content type='text'>
Changes between 1.1.1o and 1.1.1p [21 Jun 2022]

  *) In addition to the c_rehash shell command injection identified in
     CVE-2022-1292, further bugs where the c_rehash script does not
     properly sanitise shell metacharacters to prevent command injection have been
     fixed.

     When the CVE-2022-1292 was fixed it was not discovered that there
     are other places in the script where the file names of certificates
     being hashed were possibly passed to a command executed through the shell.

     This script is distributed by some operating systems in a manner where
     it is automatically executed.  On such operating systems, an attacker
     could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the script.

     Use of the c_rehash script is considered obsolete and should be replaced
     by the OpenSSL rehash command line tool.
     (CVE-2022-2068)
     [Daniel Fiala, Tomáš Mráz]

  *) When OpenSSL TLS client is connecting without any supported elliptic
     curves and TLS-1.3 protocol is disabled the connection will no longer fail
     if a ciphersuite that does not use a key exchange based on elliptic
     curves can be negotiated.
     [Tomáš Mráz]

Signed-off-by: Andre Heider &lt;a.heider@gmail.com&gt;
(cherry picked from commit eb7d2abbf06f0a3fe700df5dc6b57ee90016f1f1)
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
